Albania's political crisis has taken a decisive turn for the worse with the declaration of a state of emergency, a curfew and media censorship following the complete breakdown of governmental control in the south of the country. Furious crowds have seized arms from police and the military in protest against further collapses in pyramid share schemes which have robbed so many Albanians of their life savings.
That this quasi insurrectionary situation has grave implications for neighbouring states and regional stability in the south Balkans is only now dawning fully on an ill prepared international community. The intricate pattern of ethnic minorities and potentially reawakened irredentist claims guarantees that this should be so. So does the opportunity they provide for opportunist leaders to turn these events to their own advantage.
It is now reported that President Sali Berisha's Democratic Party is rapidly losing support in the northern part of the country to extreme Albanian nationalists who want to make an issue of the Kosovo question with Yugoslavia. Were they to do so President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia would be only too happy to respond in kind as a means of diverting attention from his own political difficulties. Likewise, Albania's tense relations with Greece and Macedonia could explode if events maintain their current chaotic momentum. Across the Adriatic, the Italian government is more and more concerned that refugees may come once again to its shores.
There is great confusion in Albania itself and elsewhere as to how the crisis ought to be resolved. Mr Berisha dismissed the prime minister, Mr Aleksander Meksi, over the weekend only to go ahead yesterday with parliamentary action that gives him a second presidential term and a full range of repressive powers. While he retains the support of the special intelligence forces and the police, there is evidence that a demoralised military may be deserting him. The trial of strength will pit his state of emergency and rapidly diminishing political support against a disorganised opposition which draws on left and wing elements in almost equal measure. There are precious few financial resources available to compensate the newly impoverished who have taken to the streets with the weapons they took from the army.
Within the European Union there are divisions between those states which favour a harder line of putting pressure on Mr Berisha and those nearer to Albania such as the Italians and the Greeks, who advocate a softer approach in the hope that he will be able to restore his control of events. But the picture of EU diplomacy flowing from this whole episode is a sorry one. It illustrates once again an overall ill preparedness as well a clear divergence among its member states, which repeats the pattern of events as the Yugoslav crisis unfolded.
Another approach, supported by the United States, advocates round table talks between the government and the opposition. This is a sensible policy, which takes proper account of the deep divisions involved. It needs to be pressed with the utmost determination and married to a readiness to come to the aid of whatever new government emerges with international aid. Above all, international efforts to head off civil war and regional instability must be given the urgent priority, they deserve.