Allowing militarists to call the shots raises fundamental questions about democracy

Nice poses serious questions about democracy, particularly in regard to defence

Nice poses serious questions about democracy, particularly in regard to defence. We're told nothing (much) is changing now, just as we were told nothing (much) was changed by Maastricht and Amsterdam. Change yesterday, change tomorrow, never change here and now.

Daniel Keohane tells us (12th May, 2001) that the treaty does not specifically mention the EU Rapid Reaction Force. This is misleading. If I say I'm going to cut bread, I have not used the word knife, yet a glance at my worktop will tell all.

But what harm? Aren't we simply taking part in a well-ordered contribution to peace and security, the Petersberg Tasks? "Humanitarian, crisis management, peacemaking" sound just the job. But what job? They are fatally vague.

Yes, they were listed in the Amsterdam Treaty. Since then, we have been frogmarched into NATO's Partnership for Peace, which hugely alters our context. We have also seen the interpretation of such superficially attractive tasks by those who literally call the shots.

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The Serbia/Kosovo bombardment was called humanitarian by Tony Blair, and for Daniel Keohane it illustrates "peacemaking operations". If that is how they work for peace, let us hope neither of them ever starts a war.

We're told what the list of tasks shall include, but not what it ex- cludes. We're told who will direct them: a new political and security committee, the military committee of the EU and the military staff of the EU. If not a single European army, then a multiple one!

But hasn't the UN admitted its dependence on regional bodies like EU/NATO? The same powers which bemoan the UN's lack of authority and resources have deliberately sidelined and scapegoated it in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and elsewhere. The failure of the UN is a construct, not an accident; it can and should be reversed.

The UN/OSCE [Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe] observers in Kosovo were withdrawn on the eve of NATO's bombing. This removal of scrutiny, amid the chaos of aerial bombardment, ironically cloaked Milosevic's slaughter. NATO made itself the only game in town by sidelining all other parties; we are still reaping the whirlwind.

But surely the EU isn't NATO? If so, why do they now envisage identical tasks for their military forces? The Nice summit confirmed "a trusting . . . permanent and effective relationship" between the two bodies. They sometimes differ about teams and captains, but not about the game they're playing. This island's history has been a long, painful lesson in the roots and the resolution of conflict. It has yielded an awareness of the defects of aggression, and of the radical patience required for real conflict resolution.

Was this lesson for home consumption only? Are we to join forces, literally, with those who show their contempt for such "naive idealism" whenever it suits them? Where would we be now if we had decided in the mid-1990s that the priority for resolving our national question was a Rapid Reaction Force?

But aren't the anti-Nice groups moralising from the sidelines, selfishly refusing to get their hands dirty in the messy search for peace? Only if it is selfish to be concerned about what is done to people we will never meet, by other people acting in our name under the banner of peace. Isn't it ironic that the nearer we come to maiming or killing many hundreds of people, the less we should want to know what is done in our name? Do bombed TV stations and water supplies, depleted uranium and cluster bombs not count if done "for peace" and far away?

The crucial issue is not whether force may ever be used. It is whether we are entitled to delegate its use to vague structures and policies which are not properly accountable. Democratic accountability here is not a selfish luxury but a vital duty, which we're being seduced into abandoning.

But won't our involvement be under UN mandate? Then why did Ireland endorse NATO's catastrophic Serbia/Kosovo "peacemaking", which Kofi Annan has said lacked such a mandate? Are mere political promises enough here, particularly from the government that joined Partnership for Peace - the front door to NATO - without the referendum it had solemnly promised?

How can we be reassured by talk of vetoes, and deciding each case on its merits? A government committed to adequate conflict resolution would long ago have questioned the whole business. Having failed to confront militarism as the common policy evolved, how can it be relied on to challenge it in the hour of crisis?

Why not use our hard-won confidence to promote generosity of spirit and real conflict resolution? Would that not be an enterprise truly deserving of support, instead of telling us democracy means always having to say yes?

John Maguire is professor emeritus of sociology in UCC, and author of Defending Peace: For an Alternative to NATO's PfP and a Militarised Europe (1999)

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