A finely-veiled sense of contempt crept though Bernadette McAliskey's commentary on how Sinn Fein had developed since the late 1980s. "There is nothing else they can offer," she told BBC Northern Ireland's Hearts and Minds, "short of lie down at their (unionists) feet."
Only a handful of old-style republicans now believe that Sinn Fein's engagement with democracy represents a capitulation to Ulster Unionism. But when, in what seemed a throwaway remark, she used the words "lock, stock and Armalite" to describe Sinn Fein's entry into what she called "partitionist politics," McAliskey expressed unionist concerns better than any of their spokesmen so far.
If hardline republicans fail to distinguish Sinn Fein and the IRA as wholly autonomous organisations, how can unionists be expected to do otherwise?
Sinn Fein's position, support and negotiating power has thrived on the ambiguity of its relationship with the IRA: it is arguable that some elements of the peace process have thrived as a result. But the same ambiguous relationship is now the biggest single liability facing the peace process, and it cannot be resolved by anyone but Sinn Fein and the IRA themselves.
Sinn Fein has more to offer. And if it cannot find a way to do so soon, it will jeopardise many of the developments sought by its own constituency.
Maintaining the ambiguity between Sinn Fein and the IRA was a necessary element of the process to date, however absolutely repugnant it has been to many people. Bertie Ahern called them "two sides of the same coin," which perfectly expressed the gamble inherent in the early days of the peace process.
The ambiguity was in ways a horrible version of the magnificent lie needed to bring democracy to Northern Ireland for the first time, and it was certainly not the only rewriting of history that became necessary, on any side. This one allowed Sinn Fein to enter mainstream politics without making the IRA appear to lose face or status with their own supporters. It undoubtedly saved lives.
As recently as a year ago, the ambiguity was still in part justifiable for strategic and pragmatic reasons. The continuing spectre of the IRA clearly enabled the republican movement to rout extremists in splinter republican groups and to bring as many potential dissenters as possible into the democratic process.
The cost was high across Northern Ireland - punishment beatings, murders, the Omagh massacre - but the strategy worked. The IRA held much of the republican community together, and in so doing, accustomed itself to a changed role where it could increase support for democratic republicanism.
Sinn Fein's appeal to the electorate grew as much from its claim to be that new voice as it did from the hard graft and community-rootedness of its members. Whereas a vote for Sinn Fein was not exactly equal to a vote for the IRA, it could be used as a way of telling the IRA that you wanted to encourage its apparent withdrawal from militarism and into political action. It did not automatically mean support for a 32-county Ireland, as some would have preferred.
The ambiguity also allowed Sinn Fein to pursue over time a more overtly party-political objective, namely the splintering of unionism by the simple process of its own self-cannibalisation. The question is whether it is now appropriate for the Irish Government to support this party-political end.
Bertie Ahern's latest revision of the IRA-Sinn Fein relationship claims the two are entirely separate, without offering evidence for that view. Much as it may have been a good short-term strategic tool, Mr Ahern's remarks sound dangerously inappropriate in the present context.
It may be unwise too. The ambiguity has been allowed to continue to the point where we are now being expected to deny it ever existed. Whereas a year ago, it could reasonably be stated that in other conflict situations, decommissioning was not as primary a requirement as it became in Northern Ireland, now as a result of the two governments' failure to respect the fears Trimble articulated then, it has become a sticking point.
Believing that Sinn Fein has no more to offer suits many people. It places the burden for action firmly and exclusively on to Ulster Unionism, and particularly on to David Trimble. This suits Sinn Fein's political objectives but it is self-seeking to the point of irresponsibility.
Wherever you're coming from, it is also unfair. The move from supremacy to power-sharing is almost as big a step for traditional unionism as is the move into democratic politics for republicanism.
Mr Trimble is being asked to find political skills that were not available to either Tony Blair or to Bertie Ahern, and this at a time when his leadership is itself under threat, despite Friday's demonstration of support for him by his party executive. He is being told that he has a win-win solution on his hands, when few in his party and in other unionist parties agree.
Despite Bertie Ahern's claims that the two are separate organisations - how, we may wonder, does he know? - only Sinn Fein and the IRA can remove this last stumbling block by removing all ambiguity. If they fail to do so, particularly before Thursday when the d'Hondt mechanism is triggered, they will expose the democratic advances that have been made to an unacceptable degree of risk.
The respect that both governments showed to Sinn Fein and the IRA by allowing them a breathing space where non-violence could be proved a more viable strategy than so-called military action has not been shown by Sinn Fein and the IRA to the concerns of other partners in the peace process.
If Sinn Fein fails to act decisively, it will place its negotiations in direct conflict with the RUC reforms to be proposed at the end of this summer by the Patten Commission. Reform of the RUC, which can happen in the context of a consensual and inclusive political settlement, may instead become a pawn on the negotiating table.
It will be ironic, to put it mildly, if the IRA and Sinn Fein become the reason for maintaining the RUC as is.
No government or assembly can be expected to reform its police force or reduce its numbers while potential terrorists remain silent, or while significant elements within the society remain unconvinced as to their bona fides. Unionists will dig in to retain the RUC in its traditional role, and could hardly be expected to do otherwise. Sinn Fein and the IRA will be directly responsible for the subsequent fall-out. In that case, they will do the republican community in particular a lasting disservice.