Security Council resolutions drafted during crises usually result from a political compromise between major powers in New York, but they may not always address clearly the realities on the ground or the difficulties a UN force may face. Is this so now with Lebanon, asks Noel Dorr
After some notable failures in the 1990s a new era for UN peacekeeping began in 2000 with the report of a high-level panel established by the secretary general and chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi.
The report was unusually clear - even blunt - in its central theme: there are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But if such a force is sent to an area of conflict it must have a clear mandate and the capacity and means to carry it out.
The Security Council endorsed this approach in November 2000. Did it meet its own standards in voting on August 11th to set up an enlarged Unifil force?
There are points to consider in judging this: the situation into which the force is to deploy and the attitudes of the main actors; the mandate and rules under which it is to operate; and who will supply and pay for the troops.
I would add another. Mr Brahimi warned that force alone cannot create peace, but only the space in which peace may be built. So will the major powers now engage in a sustained political effort, involving all the main actors, to build peace in the area and throughout the region; or will the new force, like Unifil before it, be left to languish for more than a quarter-century as the only substantial outside response to the issues underlying the conflict?
The situation in the area is clear enough to most of us by now. But some points bear repeating. Lebanon has a fragile political system and 17 recognised religious groups. It suffered 15 years of civil war. Hizbullah, though armed by Iran and Syria, is not an external force but an integral part of the country's complex political jigsaw. It is a militia with a fundamentalist outlook. But it also has a political and welfare role.
It has strong support among the disadvantaged Shia minority, not only in the south but elsewhere in Lebanon. Four external actors are important. Iran and Syria arm Hizbullah. Israel, determined to end attacks across its border, devastated Lebanon in the mistaken belief that a majority would blame Hizbullah.
The US considers Hizbullah a terrorist organisation and sees Israel's fight with it as part of the "war on terror". So it resupplied Israel with armaments and refused for weeks to call for a ceasefire to give Israel time to finish off Hizbullah.
This did not happen. The fighting continued and neither side seemed able or willing to stop.
They have stopped now. Critics of the UN should note that they did so only when the Security Council adopted a resolution and decided on a UN force. But the ceasefire is fragile and an important point is less than clear. What will be the role of the force and what exactly will it do?
Traditional UN peacekeeping resolutions, like that which set up Unifil in 1978, derive from Chapter six of the UN Charter which deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes. Chapter seven, in contrast, has much tougher provisions which allow the Security Council to impose sanctions or authorise the use of force to maintain international peace. The present resolution is a compromise which draws on both chapters. It does not explicitly invoke the Council's Chapter seven authority, as such resolutions usually do: Lebanon would not accept this. But in "determining that the situation . . . constitutes a threat to international peace . . " it uses the language of Article 39, which is part of Chapter seven. A similar compromise is evident throughout: most paragraphs "call for" or "request"; only those which establish the UN force and require states to embargo arms sales use the decisive language of Chapter seven. Some call this "Chapter 6½". An earlier US-French draft of August 6th called for a cessation of hostilities; set out principles for a long-term settlement; and promised, in unspecified terms, a later resolution setting up an international force. Lebanon and the Arab states rejected it because it implied that Israel could keep its troops in Lebanon until that force arrived. And because the "cessation" covered only offensive actions by Israel. The paragraph about "cessation" is still unchanged. But something new happened on August 7th: the Lebanese government, including its Hizbullah members, agreed to deploy 15,000 Lebanese troops to southern Lebanon.
This meant extending the government's authority for the first time in years, to the whole country. Something which all states profess to support and which the UN resolution setting up the original Unifil called for in 1978.
It is this decision, now being implemented, which made the new resolution possible. The underlying idea is that instead of a vague promise of a future international force, Unifil will be greatly enlarged and its job essentially will be to assist Lebanese forces - generally regarded as weak and possibly divided internally. As the Lebanese government extends its control to the south, Israeli forces will withdraw in parallel.
Disarming Hizbullah is not mentioned explicitly, but Lebanon south of the Litani river is to be "free of any armed personnel" except for Lebanese forces and Unifil. Though how this will be done is unclear. The resolution is obviously a careful compromise, intended to maintain a fragile ceasefire. So timing, and the early arrival of the new UN force, are vital. What exactly does the resolution authorise the UN force to do? In summary, four tasks. It is to
(1) Take "all necessary action" to ensure its area of operations is not used for hostile activities.
(2) "Resist attempts by forceful means" to prevent it carrying out its mandate.
(3) Protect UN personnel and equipment.
(4) "Without prejudice to the responsibility of the Lebanese government," protect civilians under imminent threat.
But there are obvious dangers. Much now depends on whether the Lebanese government holds together and whether Hizbullah, which is a part of it, will really accept government authority in the south. The UN force will certainly face difficulties. Yet without it, the present "cessation" is unlikely to last.
But the crying longer-term need is to draw the major players, including Syria and Iran, into serious negotiations; and above all, to re-engage with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is central to peace in the region and beyond.
Noel Dorr is a former Irish ambassador to the UN, and a member of the Irish Times Trust