Welcome to post-agreement Ireland. A changed land. It's not just this island's north-east corner that has changed. North and South people have taken their prejudices and put them to one side. Principles that had been clung to were re-examined and found to have outlived their usefulness, practicality or applicability.
Our own Government provided us with a great example of how much had changed. A Fianna Fail-led Coalition had asked the population to support an agreement that would remove our constitutional claim to the territory of Northern Ireland. And 90 per cent of those who came out to vote on the day voted for it. A very few years ago Fianna Fail would not have countenanced supporting such a move, and the Irish population would not have voted for it.
What has caused all these changes is the simple idea of peace. Following the first IRA ceasefire everyone got to experience what it is like to live somewhere not characterised and controlled by the bullet and the bomb. And they loved the freedom to be optimistic. They embraced the possibilities suddenly available to them. They realised that just because a conflict has lasted for a generation doesn't mean it has to last for ever.
With the end of the ceasefire all of those hopes were taken away from them. They felt cheated by the hesitation, caution, bitterness, political point-scoring and, most importantly, selfishly short-term outlook of those who let the ceasefire collapse.
This time, and after so much painstaking negotiation, they weren't willing to let the opportunity slip away again. The politicians realised this, understood what was expected of them and produced a workable agreement.
The populations, North and South, weren't too concerned with the individual clauses of the deal, only with what it promised. They didn't vote for the agreement, they voted for peace, for progress and for optimism. They knew that these precious things would have to be bought, and that the price might be high, but they were more than willing to pay it.
Even the campaigns run by the No groups had to allow for that. They didn't focus on individual clauses but argued that this agreement was a step towards a united Ireland. They were also careful to point out that they weren't trying to wreck the whole process, just the agreement. That, in some way, peace could and would be achieved, just not through this agreement.
Even in the week since the Belfast Agreement was mandated we have seen this change in priorities in action. Take the Harryville protest. Deep-seated religious and sectarian differences were at the core of this dispute. Differences of the kind that wars have been fought over. The kind for which people have willingly died. But when they were put in the balance, measured against the prospect of peace they were found wanting. And the protest was ended.
Over the summer two more divisive problems will have to be dealt with. The marching season is about to start. Decisions will have to be taken at senior political level in Northern Ireland to avoid a repeat of the conflicts and confrontations that characterised last year's marches.
More significantly, the elections to the Assembly will take place next month. With those elections will come electioneering. This is a problem because one of the best ways to get elected, and by far the easiest, is by running a negative campaign: attacking, ridiculing and berating your opponents at every opportunity.
Added to that is the fact that some of the people intending to stand for election have no interest in making the Assembly work. They wish only to sabotage it and the agreement. Their campaigns will be built on the most negative of strategies. Already they are trying to force the decommissioning of the IRA's weapons back on to the agenda. Decommissioning doesn't belong on any agenda right now: even the agreement itself acknowledges that. "All participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. They also confirm their intention to continue to work constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission, and to use any influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years following endorsement in referendums North and South of the agreement and in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement."
With the two-year time-frame built into the agreement, raising decommissioning at this stage can only be seen as a spoiling tactic. An attempt to focus opinion on what is currently an irrelevancy. Furthermore both sides, nationalist and loyalist, have arms stockpiles, but it is IRA weapons that are being mentioned almost exclusively.
But the problems with decommissioning, whenever it might happen, are more serious.
Never before has any paramilitary organisation anywhere in the world handed in its weapons voluntarily, unless it has been militarily defeated. It is unrealistic to assume that the North will be any different.
Add to that the practical difficulties.
No one except the paramilitaries themselves knows what weapons they really have, so proving complete decommissioning will be impossible. And, even if all their stores were destroyed, what would stop them re-arming should they decide to start their campaigns again? Certainly not the cost. Fertiliser, one of the most widely used raw materials for explosives is not that expensive. There are arms available and easy to come by worldwide. There are 190,000 legally held weapons in the North itself, so even stealing some would not be that complex.
The events at the Grand National proved that the IRA is capable of pursuing a highly successful terror campaign in Britain using the threat of violence alone.
Pragmatically, what we should be expecting from the decommissioning mechanism is not a convoy of articulated trucks arriving at Stormont on an appointed day with cargoes of gift-wrapped weapons and bomb-making equipment.
What will happen is that significant gestures will be made: certain amounts of explosives or guns will be left in remote areas for collection by the authorities. These symbolic actions will show what should, at this stage, be obvious, that the paramilitaries will never again operate like they have before in Northern Ireland.
Some splinter groups such as the Continuity Army Council may continue to try to influence the future through violence; but with vigorous security activity North and South, and without any serious public support or even sympathy, they will wither on the vine.
The people have spoken. The people want peace. The people will not be denied again.