It has always been a mistake to underestimate the craftiness and calculation of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, a truth that is evident once again as he squares up for another confrontation with the United States. The regime has survived intact by using such skills. They have been applied domestically and with ruthless effect against successive opposition, regional and dissident minorities. In the Middle East region, Iraq is a strong player well used to playing tactical games with neighbours. Through its oil wealth, it is accustomed to playing a role in world affairs, which became clear during the war with Iraq in the 1980s and then in the Gulf War that followed its invasion of Kuwait.
On this occasion, the Iraqi leader has responded rapidly to what he perceives as a split in the ranks of the Gulf War coalition ranged against him in the United Nations Security Council. France, Russia and China abstained on a resolution on October 23rd which would have increased travel sanctions against Iraqi officials who interfere with efforts by the United Nations Special Commission (Unscom) on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Iraq responded by refusing to accept US arms inspectors. This threatened the integrity of the UN in a vital field, on which there is ample evidence of systematic Iraqi efforts to avoid or bypass the commission's work.
The current fevered efforts to find a compromise formula which would reunite the permanent members have been overshadowed by speculation about what retaliation the Security Council should take if Iraq escalates the confrontation further. A military strike, as has been hinted at by the US and Britain, would not find favour with France, China or Russia. It may, however, suit Saddam Hussein to provoke it precisely for that reason. His losses, in terms of casualties and destroyed military equipment, could be far outweighed by his gains. He would attract credibility in the Arab world as the leader capable of standing up to the Americans. Given the near collapse of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, and a complex regional realignment involving Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia it is not difficult to understand why this should be so.
Both France and Russia have large economic interests in allowing Iraq to emerge from the tight corset of sanctions imposed since the end of the Cold War. They point out, with considerable justification, that the policy followed by the US and Britain amounts to a determination to remove Saddam Hussein from power by continuing sanctions, and that this provides no incentives for an Iraq ruled by him to improve its behaviour. Many international humanitarian organisations argue similarly that the sanctions penalise the population, not the regime, and therefore reinforce his rule. In all these circumstances, diplomacy is the better, the more intelligent, way to resolve this crisis, rather than a resort to force. France and Russia have issued strong statements insisting that Iraq should co-operate fully with Unscom. Their credibility on this matter is also at stake, if they are to sustain the case for a diplomatic outcome. In return for it, they should be able to insist on Iraqi compliance with the arms inspectorate. But that, of course, would deprive Saddam Hussein of the capacity to provoke an American attack.