Trying to persuade an armed revolutionary movement to take a political path is one of the toughest undertakings in Irish history. Yesterday's IRA statement indicates that the republican leadership has pulled off the near impossible task despite facing daunting odds.
It is a measure of Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams, the prime architects of the new policy, that, while they have shed some supporters along the way, the movement has reached this point with a minimum of defections. Given the history of splits in Irish republicanism and the bloody aftermath of such divisions, this is a remarkable achievement in itself.
Adams and McGuinness have achieved this new era through a combination of extraordinary patience and an innate skill at understanding their own movement, its history, and its cross-currents and trends.
The move on arms came only after an exhaustive series of internal consultations and meetings which spanned the North, the Republic and Irish-America. Events such as the Colombia arrests and the World Trade Centre bombings of September 11th certainly accelerated the process, but were not by themselves decisive. Having committed themselves to "taking the gun out of Irish politics" as far back as 1994, the Sinn FΘin leadership has since worked unstintingly to make that happen.
At all critical moments they have made the right decisions. When the so-called "Real IRA" split off - a potentially fatal development given that the dissidents came close to taking over the IRA at a fraught convention - the risky decision was to ignore rather than confront them.
This was made with the belief that they would soon lack basic credibility with the republican grassroots. That decision was amply rewarded as the "Real IRA" fell prey to numerous informers and the dreadful Omagh bombing.
It was another indicator that Adams and McGuinness have never lost their bearings when it came to what was important to that movement. No matter how much the outside world, from the White House to 10 Downing Street to editorial boards, urged them to move on a particular issue, by necessity the timing was always of their own choosing, much to the frustration of many.
It also often led to reams of ill-informed comment about the motives of the Sinn FΘin leadership and what they were trying to achieve. If there is one consequence of this extraordinary step on weapons it will be to sideline historically such naysayers for ever.
"Adams is a 98 per cent person," said a leading Sinn FΘin figure recently. "He's essentially very conservative in terms of his own party, he won't move until he believes he has an absolutely overwhelming level of support."
This same source stated that, within his own movement, Adams has an extraordinary ability to convince others, even those diametrically opposed to his argument.
"I have seen him time and again go into meetings where only 5 per cent of the people there agreed with his position and I have seen him emerge hours later with a majority behind him."
McGuinness, too, carries an almost mythic stature within the movement and played a huge role in keeping it united after the "Real IRA" defections. Together, the two constitute a formidable team. To the outside world, the internal debate could often become an incredibly tedious process, as the endless wrangling over decommissioning indicated. But the consequences of a premature move were obvious to the Sinn FΘin leadership, who knew that many lives, including their own, were on the line, as well as the ideas they were pushing.
They were also hampered by the sheer scale of what they were attempting. Prior to 1994 the party was isolated and they had only to deal with their own internal politics. After the IRA ceasefire they suddenly had to negotiate with other parties in Northern Ireland, the Irish, British and US governments and the parties in the Republic as well as to fight elections in two jurisdictions.
During this period it was common to witness senior Sinn FΘin figures, haggard from exhaustion, gear up for yet another key peace process meeting. They have never got it wrong. While the outside world watched Sinn FΘin leaders entering the White House or 10 Downing Street the leadership was keeping a weather eye on how such developments were playing back home and constantly reassuring their base that the project was moving ahead.
At times it was an incredible high-wire act, none more so than after the breakdown of the first IRA ceasefire in 1996, when a group of deeply suspicious and angry militants threatened to blow the peace process apart. Winning back that ceasefire may well count as the greatest achievement of the Sinn FΘin leadership.
Now once again they have transformed the landscape of Northern Ireland. They have finally chosen the fork in the road. How far they can now go down it remains to be seen.
Fianna Fβil for many years revelled in its status of being a "slightly constitutional" party after the end of the Civil War, and Fine Gael had its own dalliance with extra-constitutional activity when it had ties to the Blueshirts. Sinn FΘin may well in time look back on this period as one of necessary but painful transition.
There are still key questions to be answered, of course, most important of which is how quickly the governments and the Ulster Unionists will respond to this historic gesture. But there is no question now that a Rubicon has been crossed and that this generation of leaders now has an unprecedented opportunity to bring about a peace on the island of Ireland which has been lacking since the Northern state was established. The Sinn FΘin leadership has made a truly extraordinary contribution to that ideal
Niall O'Dowd is editor of the Irish Voice newspaper of New York