In recent weeks the threat to the eventual stability of the Fianna Fail Progressive Democrats Coalition posed by the twists and turns of evidence given to the Flood tribunal has clearly intensified.
The growing tension between the Coalition partners over the tribunal issues might, perhaps, have been more containable, at least in the short run, if the Ahern-Harney relationship had not been gratuitously damaged by the Taoiseach's unwise handling of his routine intervention in the Sheedy affair.
In the long run, the impact of the tribunals upon the continuation in office of this Government might, perhaps, have been little different; but a crisis might have been postponed further down the line than now seems likely. As matters now stand, a single further disturbing revelation from the tribunals may be sufficient to precipitate the collapse of this Government.
Most of the Coalition's woes can be traced back to the Taoiseach's decision in June 1997 to appoint Ray Burke as Minister for Foreign Affairs: if he had been left on the back benches, then the fall-out from the Flood tribunal in terms of Coalition stability might have been containable.
Indeed, there could even have been some benefit for the Taoiseach from tribunal revelations about Mr Burke, which if he had been left on the back benches might retrospectively have made his omission from the Government seem remarkably wise.
Attention is now turning to the question of why, in fact, that appointment was ever made. Enough has now been revealed to demonstrate that, on the basis of what Bertie Ahern knew at the time, it was a very high-risk decision, indeed.
The fact that on the one hand the incoming Taoiseach knew that Mr Burke had received £30,000 from Murphy Bros but on the other hand also knew from Dermot Ahern that Joseph Murphy jnr had denied making any such payment, should have been enough to have alerted him to the likelihood that something improper might have been involved.
What can have led Bertie Ahern to make such a dangerous mistake? There have been suggestions in the press that Mr Burke had information damaging to him which he would have revealed if not appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. But, unless and until any such information emerges from Mr Burke's evidence to the Flood tribunal, that speculation must, I believe, be set aside in favour of other less dramatic explanations.
One possibility would be that because Mr Burke had been helpful to Mr Ahern during his period in opposition between 1994 and 1997, the new Fianna Fail leader felt in some way morally obliged, despite the conflict of evidence arising from his cursory investigation of Mr Burke's activities, to appoint him to the Government.
An alternative explanation, thrown out in the course of the Questions And Answers programme last Monday, is that the Taoiseach succumbed to a threat by Mr Burke to resign his Dail seat if not appointed.
The trouble with both of these explanations is that if either of them were in fact true, this would cast doubts on Mr Ahern's suitability for the job he now holds. Especially where the appointment of a colleague would involve an evident risk of a scandal that could bring down the Government in process of formation, the "old pals' act" cannot be allowed to govern such an appointment.
As to the second possibility, any Taoiseach who allowed his choice of Cabinet members to be determined by threats of a Dail resignation would thereby lose the moral authority necessary to govern.
SOME of the current public discussion of this problem seems to turn this whole issue on its head, seeming to suggest that Mr Burke simply had to be appointed unless the new Taoiseach had actual proof of misbehaviour. But that, quite simply, is rubbish. On appointment in 1992, Albert Reynolds had dropped such significant figures as Gerry Collins, John Wilson and Rory O'Hanlon, not to speak of Mr Burke. And he had also demoted Mary O'Rourke to a junior ministry. Mr Ahern had ample recent precedents upon which to draw.
My own contemporary reaction to Mr Burke's appointment two years ago was to feel that by this action the new Taoiseach had probably shortened the life of his new Government. When writing this column for the Saturday before that Government was formed, I had in fact been tempted to warn that this might be so, but, especially because I could not give my reasons for that belief, I realised that this would be inappropriate and almost certainly also counterproductive.
Accordingly, I contented myself with the following much less explicit final paragraph to my article:
"Bertie Ahern's choice of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Justice may be crucial. Not all the potential candidates for these posts have in the past demonstrated the cool head and diplomatic subtlety and skill likely to be required at this time."
Where do we now go from here?
First of all, and especially in view of the decision to suspend Flood tribunal hearings during the European and local election campaigns, it seems unlikely that matters will come to a head in the near future. Indeed, a crisis might yet be postponed for quite a period.
Moreover, for the Progressive Democrats there could be a clear advantage in breaking with Fianna Fail as and when a further tribunal development gives them reason to do so. For, if thereafter they remained in Government with Fianna Fail, their prospects at the next election would be rendered very uncertain, whereas if they broke on an issue of this kind, they might have quite a good election.
It has, moreover, become increasingly clear - partly because of a shift in the PD approach to social policy, but partly also because of the simplification of our political party structure as a result of the merger of Labour with Democratic Left - that the former sharp ideological differences which had previously made them unacceptable partners in a coalition involving Labour and Fine Gael no longer apply. Meanwhile, the Government has important external matters to carry forward. These include both a resolution of the Northern Ireland deadlock in conjunction with the Blair government and adherence to the Partnership for Peace to be secured by an appropriate resolution of the Dail.
This latter matter has been complicated by three factors. One is the foolish election promise of a referendum on this issue, which Mr Ahern - who at that time was little informed about such matters - was misled into making as a result of Ray Burke's opportunistic stance on this issue.
Another is the Labour Party's recent commitment to seek such a referendum as a means of patching up the diametric opposition between its president and leader on the issue itself. And, third, the anti-PfP propaganda that some elements have been making out of NATO's current Yugoslav embarrassments.
Following an election taking place after a breakdown in its relationship with the Progressive Democrats on this issue, Fianna Fail would clearly be likely to have difficulty in securing any coalition partner, and in these circumstances it would also seem very unlikely to secure an overall majority.
In that situation, the formation of any government in those circumstances could be difficult. Thus far the main Opposition parties have gained little from the discomfiture of Fianna Fail. Recent polls have consistently shown a drift in public attitudes this year towards a combination of a higher abstention rate - don't-knows up from 13 per cent to 18 per cent - and greater support for smaller parties and independents, up from 5-6 per cent to 8-9 per cent.
However that may be, it is now clear that the damage done to Fianna Fail during the Haughey years is likely to be long-lasting. True, the number of the party's Dail members whose behaviour has been put in question is very small. Even its worst enemies would concede that over 90 per cent of Fianna Fail TDs are above suspicion.
But, despite the courageous stances of such figures as Jack Lynch, Erskine Childers and George Colley at an earlier stage, and Des O'Malley and David Andrews throughout the whole period - not to speak of Charlie McCreevy with his repeated involvement in challenges to the Haughey leadership - the persistent failure of a majority of the party to oppose what was happening during this period has left it seriously damaged.
Of course, more recently a new generation of younger politicians has arrived on the Fianna Fail scene, men and women who have no responsibility for past misbehaviour, and who are quite clearly totally committed to clean politics.
But the problem for the party lies in the fact that its current leadership still includes a number of people who are seen by the electorate to have failed to make a stand against past malpractices.