Against a background of security crises Ted Heath worked hard to pursue a "political solution" in Northern Ireland, writes Joe Carroll
In 1983, nine years after he was ousted as prime minister, Ted Heath on a visit to Belfast described himself as "the best friend Ulster ever had". Both unionists and nationalists would almost certainly contest this self-assessment but in his four years in Downing Street, Heath, who died on Sunday, worked hard to bring about a settlement which foreshadowed the 1998 Belfast agreement.
When Heath came to power in June 1970, the outgoing Labour government under Harold Wilson had begun a reform programme to deal with nationalist grievances following the outbreak of violence in the Bogside in Derry in August 1969. Unionists probably hoped the leader of the Conservative and Unionist Party would show them more favour but as historian Prof Joe Lee has observed, "Edward Heath had no intention of placing Britain in moral bondage to Ulster unionism." But Heath was wary of both sides and at first resented any attempt by the government in Dublin to interfere, as he saw it, in the affairs of Northern Ireland. The introduction of internment in August 1971 by Northern prime minister Brian Faulkner had Heath's reluctant approval as the security situation worsened, but he soon regretted the drastic action and secretly began preparing a political solution through his home secretary, Reginald Maudling.
Relations between Heath and taoiseach Jack Lynch reached a low point when the latter publicly protested against internment and said he would support "the policy of passive resistance now being pursued by the non-Unionist population". Heath was enraged and roused the British ambassador in Dublin to deliver a riposte to Lynch that night. Heath told the Taoiseach that "your telegram of today is unjustifiable in its contents, unacceptable in its attempt to interfere in the affairs of the United Kingdom and can in no way contribute to the solution of the problems of Northern Ireland." There was more in the same vein.
Following this fiery exchange, relations slowly began to improve and Lynch met Heath twice in Chequers in the following months. The second meeting also involved Brian Faulkner and was the first tripartite summit. Following this meeting, Heath made a cautious statement about possible reunification which, if it did not go as far as Lynch wanted, showed a new flexibility by London.
It was "legitimate" for Catholics in Northern Ireland to seek unification with the South by democratic and peaceful means, Heath said. "If at some future date the majority of the people in Northern Ireland want unification and express that desire in the appropriate constitutional manner, I do not believe any British government would stand in the way." Bloody Sunday on January 30th, 1972, provoked another testy exchange when Lynch telephoned Heath to protest at the shooting dead of 13 civilians by British paratroopers during a banned march in the Bogside against internment. Lynch accused the British troops of reacting in an undisciplined way but Heath retorted that it was a banned march and reminded Lynch that he had continually been calling for the banning of provocative marches.
Heath was also irritated by the decision by Lynch to appeal to the United Nations for intervention in Northern Ireland by sending the minister for foreign affairs, Dr Hillery, to New York and then to Washington, Ottawa and Paris to drum up international support. British ambassadors were ordered to get London's view across before Hillery arrived.
But Bloody Sunday marked the end of Heath's patience with Faulkner's attempts to use the iron fist in Northern Ireland. When the latter refused an ultimatum to allow London to take charge of all security operations in the North, Heath dissolved Stormont and appointed a secretary of state, William Whitelaw, to run Northern Ireland.
In case Dublin opposed this move, Heath had secretly ordered a list of sanctions against the Republic to be drawn up. They included identity cards for the Irish living in Britain, work permits, trade restrictions and expulsion of Ireland from the sterling area. But Lynch welcomed the abolition of Stormont and direct rule from London.
Heath pressed ahead with plans for a "political solution" for the North and a special cabinet group discussed Maudling's proposals in detail. Feelers were also put out to the Provisional IRA and, with Heath's approval, there was a meeting between IRA leaders, including Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, and Whitelaw and aides in London on July 7th, just after the IRA called a temporary ceasefire.
Nothing came of the meeting and the ceasefire broke down with both sides blaming each other. Heath then authorised Operation Motorman to allow British troops to invade the IRA "no go" areas in Belfast and Derry. But in case there would be a complete breakdown in law and order that summer across Northern Ireland, Heath ordered officials to draw up "Contingency Planning". This was to allow for a scenario where the government was "on the point of losing control of events". The drastic measures, which were never implemented, included a redrawing of the Border to bring about a transfer of large sectors of the Catholic population from Northern Ireland. This would be accompanied by a massive influx of British troops "to swamp all extremist strongholds" both nationalist and loyalist.
By the end of 1972, IRA violence had diminished and Heath was encouraged to press on with the plan for a political solution based on a discussion paper called The Future of Northern Ireland. Two ideas were introduced which caused unionist dismay. The first called for a role in government for the nationalist minority as a form of power-sharing. The second referred to the "Irish dimension" in the affairs of Northern Ireland, the first time this expression was used.
Heath and Whitelaw pushed ahead in 1973 with proposals for an Assembly, a power-sharing Executive and a Council of Ireland where Dublin and Belfast would co-operate in a list of areas to be agreed later. By now Lynch had been replaced as taoiseach by Liam Cosgrave, who headed the new Fine Gael-Labour coalition.
Cosgrave and Heath had differing ideas on the scope of the proposed Council of Ireland but Heath was now determined to secure a political solution. Following the Assembly elections and the formation of the Executive with the SDLP sharing power with the unionists and the Alliance Party, Heath called the Sunningdale conference where the role of the Council of Ireland was to be threshed out.
Heath chaired the difficult meetings and was later criticised for allowing Dublin and the SDLP to win concessions at the expense of Brian Faulkner.
The decision by Heath to call a general election in February 1974 because of the worsening economic situation was opposed in cabinet by the new secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Francis Pym, who argued that it would weaken and even destroy the fledgeling Executive. In the event, Heath lost the election, the Faulkner unionists were heavily defeated by anti-agreement unionists and the Executive was brought down by strikes organised by the loyalist Ulster Workers' Council.
Heath a decade later criticised the Wilson government for not doing enough to maintain the power-sharing arrangement. But he had also unwittingly contributed to its demise.