The deep and unresolved political and economic crisis in Russia appeared to reduce President Clinton's role during his visit there to that of a mere observer, apparently incapable of influencing immediate events. Lack of substance arising from the summit bears out such an analysis, but it is at best a half-truth. The rest of the world has a vital interest in the outcome of Russia's crisis, as has been dramatically evidenced by this week's turbulence on world markets, which is directly related to events there.
It was important that Mr Clinton was there to underline this fact and to urge continuing support for the Russian reform programme, irrespective of the power vacuum in Moscow or his own political difficulties over the Lewinski affair. Brokering by the United States has been clearly seen in Ireland ahead of his visit here over the next three days - a timely reminder, were it necessary, that involvement of the world's most powerful leader can play a crucial role virtually anywhere.
Mr Clinton said further financial aid will be possible if Russia's leaders stay broadly on the political and economic reform path already set out. Specifically, he suggested a fairer tax collection system; advised against printing money to bail out banks and pay outstanding bills; said there should be no special support for the privileged few; and made a plea that Russia's international creditors should be given fair treatment.
This is good advice as far as it goes. Unfortunately, there are such profound contradictions, both of interests and ideology, running through Russia's ruling elites that there is little prospect of it being heeded. President Yeltsin is still credited with a strong commitment to the reform programme by close US and Russian observers, despite his erratic and volatile political behaviour in dismissing successive governments. But by opting to bring back Mr Chernomyrdin, he has opened up policy both to the special big business interest groups he represents and to the likelihood of a coalition involving the communist opposition. It is unlikely that these groups can exist harmoniously in government or make the tough and difficult decisions required to turn the crisis around.
The only feasible way through, is likely to involve more autarky, protection and at least a suspension of economic internationalisation for several years. That assumes (which is still the most probable outcome) that the Duma will eventually agree, on a third vote in several weeks time after much more political bartering, to endorse Mr Chernomyrdin as prime minister. The alternative would be elections, which many opposition parties are reluctant to contemplate.
Russia's autonomy in making these decisions must be respected by the rest of the world, as must its democratic and constitutional procedures. But precisely because of its continuing importance as a military power, still heavily armed with the most dangerous nuclear weapons, it is impossible to consider its fate in political isolation. The signal its economic troubles sends out internationally is equally traumatic. A sympathetic concern for its welfare and a readiness to respond constructively to its pleas for support are necessary and prudent for American, European and Asian leaders, confronted suddenly with grave choices concerning the world's political and economic stability.