Sir, - Brian P. Murphy (August 10th) raises some interesting points regarding Tom Barry's first report of the Kilmichael ambush. However, he is wrong to state that my reconstruction in The IRA and its Enemies is "largely based" on this document. In fact, my primary sources were interviews with participants and statements made by them, conducted and collected by myself and others.
The details are given in my book. It is these men's eyewitness accounts which contradict Barry's memoirs, and which provide the main body of evidence about what really happened on November 28th, 1920.
The document in question is, however, significant in that it is the first written account of the ambush and it (and Barry's first published account in 1932) is remarkably different from the later, now familiar, story. It was only later that Barry claimed the Auxiliaries were wiped out because their "false surrender" lured three Volunteers to their deaths.
But is this report authentic? Murphy first notes that we do not have the original and that, as well as appearing in the unprinted, unpublished 6th Division history, it appears in a confidential printed (but not published) pamphlet issued to units by the Irish Command in 1921. This was not a piece of propaganda. In fact, it used dozens of captured documents to illustrate IRA methods and tactics. The pamphlet's British author even comments that the Kilmichael report does not support the official version of the ambush, which claimed the IRA mutilated the Auxiliaries' bodies.
We must therefore ask the following questions: why would the British army forge a document which does not agree with its version of events, and then keep it secret except to mislead its own officers as to IRA methods? Presumably Murphy does not question the provenance of the other reprinted documents (many can be found in Irish archives), so why suspect this one only? It seems to me that its inclusion among so many other authentic documents actually reinforces its believability.
Murphy also points to the report's omissions of detail and to inconsistencies with later versions, although he does note the reference to the column being split into sections as accurate. Other details which only participants could have known include the times given, the casualties and the fact that one Auxiliary escaped. The omissions can be attributed to the report's brevity, which also explains how Barry could write it so fast. The fact that he felt the need to write it all (which Murphy questions) could be held against any of the numerous similar reports he wrote about later actions, which can be found in the Richard Mulcahy Papers in the UCD Archives.
The inconsistencies arise from Barry's explanation of why the ambush happened. In the report - unlike his latter accounts - he suggests the ambush was accidental and unavoidable. Why? Possibly because it was unauthorised and outside brigade boundaries. This ensured Barry could stay in charge, but required explanation. And why would British forgers make up this otherwise insignificant detail anyway?
Finally, Murphy argues that other writers' mention of a "false surrender" supports Barry's later claims. I agree that F. P. Crozier's "findings" must be taken into account, but neither he nor Piaras Beaslai were there. Their references must be put alongside equally serious endorsements of the equally false British version by such writers as General Macready and W. A. Phillips. Repetition doesn't make either any truer. Kilmichael was the subject of a propaganda battle from the outset: it's hardly surprising that the truth lay in neither camp.
Why is the "false surrender" so important? Because from Barry's point of view it justified the "extermination" of unarmed and wounded prisoners. We know this happened: Barry and his biographer admit it, and many witnesses have described it in detail. These same witnesses deny Barry's claims - as do, implicitly, his earliest accounts. I would invite readers to ignore Barry's self-constructed reputation, weigh these facts and draw their own conclusions. - Yours, etc.,
Peter Hart,
School of Politics,
Queen's University,
Belfast 7.