Ariel Sharon's victory within his party this week is likely to reinforce his determination to maintain his hardline stance, writes Michael Jansen
By narrowly defeating the attempt to depose him as Likud leader, Ariel Sharon may have dealt a serious blow to the possibility of resurrecting the moribund Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Sharon's narrow victory ensures that he will not, at least for the time being, leave the Likud. An opinion poll taken after last Monday's ballot within the Likud's central committee reveals that were the party's members to vote today, Sharon would not only triumph over his nearest rival, Binyamin Netanyahu, by 47.6 per cent to 33.8 per cent, but he would also win in a first round against multiple challengers.
However, Sharon cannot hope to maintain this strong position unless he cleaves to the Likud's central ideology. By doing so, he may be able to rein in renegade ministers, Knesset members and central committee members, and contain the challenge from Netanyahu, who intends to run against him when the party membership votes, on schedule, next April, ahead of the November general election.
The main tenet of Likud policy, adopted by its first government, formed in 1977 by Menachem Begin, was that the Jewish people have an "unchallengeable, eternal, historic right" to the land of Israel [ all of geographic Palestine], the "inheritance of their forefathers", as well as the right to build urban and rural settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. Sharon cannot afford to deviate from this dictum if he is to be re-elected and lead Likud into the election, in which the party is almost certain to win by retaining or increasing its 40 seats in the 120-member Knesset.
This means that there will be no major unilateral withdrawals (or "disengagements") from the West Bank to follow the Gaza evacuation.
Sharon will adhere to his demand that the Palestinian Authority must disarm Hamas and other militant groups as a condition for negotiations. However, since the Palestinians cannot deliver on this, there will be no negotiations. Sharon will continue to use the Israeli army and air force as an iron fist to pound the Palestinian resistance. And he will intensify Israel's colonisation and wall construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Such hardline stands were heralded in a statement this week by Eyal Arad, Sharon's senior security adviser, to the effect that Israel would consider annexing portions of the West Bank which it intends to retain if the diplomatic impasse with the Palestinians continues.
This could mean that Israel would pull its military forces and settlers behind the 680km wall which juts deep into the West Bank and which could be used to unilaterally define the eastern border of Israel.
The wall and the major settlements Israel is determined to keep would appropriate at least 46 per cent of the West Bank, corral 242,000 Palestinians within the annexed zone and deny 2.26 million Palestinians access to this area, including Jerusalem.
Of course, Israel would only carry out such a threat after a decisive Likud victory in the general election, because Sharon cannot afford to yield any more territory before then. Once back in power as leader of the Likud, Sharon would continue to be bound by its "Greater Israel" policy.
But since he believes that Israel must no longer rule over Palestinians, Sharon favours "Greater Israel minus".
He seeks to leave Palestinian population concentrations located in unconnected enclaves at the centre of the West Bank. He also intends to retain control of the Jordan River valley as a buffer and security zone, adding to the 46 per cent who would be consumed by the wall and the settlements.
"Greater Israel minus" plus the Jordan River security zone would leave West Bank Palestinians completely surrounded, controlled by and dependent upon Israel, and would finish off any prospect of creating a viable Palestinian state.
If Sharon had been defeated in Monday's ballot and risked being ousted from the leadership, he apparently planned to quit the Likud and cobble together a new centrist party from "moderate" elements in the Likud and disaffected Labour supporters.
Sharon's departure would have halved Likud's strength in the Knesset and left Netanyahu and the right-wing "national camp" in a rump Likud which would have no chance to win power even if it went into coalition with other hard-right parties.
Opinion polls show that a new centre-oriented party under Sharon, who is popular with a majority of Israelis, would win the largest number of seats in a new parliament. Sharon willing, it could form a government which would have enough broad support to abandon the Likud's obsolete "Greater Israel" and "Greater Israel minus" ideology.
Furthermore, the dissolution of the Likud would have led to a dramatic realignment of the Israeli political spectrum. Since the peace process - inaugurated by the signing of the Oslo accord in 1993 - began to falter and fail, the centre gradually shifted to the right. This drift could have been halted by a strong centrist party. Labour leftists could have joined with like-minded Peace Now to press the centre to resume serious negotiations with the Palestinians, transforming the current deadlock into peaceful dialogue accompanied by the lifting of restrictions on the Palestinians.