Financial markets in the west have studiously ignored the fighting in Kosovo. Indeed, Wall Street recorded historic heights in the last few days and, although performance in key European stock markets was more subdued, this is certainly not because any institutional investor bothered to learn how to pronounce Milosevic's name.
To a certain extent, the financial markets' reaction is understandable. The republics of the former Yugoslavia were never serious investment propositions and few believed that the old debt for which Milosevic's government remains responsible would ever be recovered. Another war in the Balkans is, sadly, hardly a novelty and the financial markets originally assumed that, as heartrending as Kosovo's fate may be, the crisis can hardly dampen worldwide economic prospects.
In essence, markets accepted without a murmur the assumption that air strikes against Yugoslavia would be swift, "surgical" and effective, precisely what western governments originally claimed, but with the war in the Balkans now marking its first month with no end in sight, institutional investors will soon be having second thoughts.
Western governments are stuck with a policy of air strikes against the Yugoslav government. As long as this is the case, the number of po tential western casualties in this conflict will be limited, yet pressure is growing to introduce ground troops as well. A build-up of western troops is in progress and, sooner rather than later, these troops will enter Kosovo to protect the refugees.
Nobody knows how much fighting there will be, but two things are clear: western casualties are no longer excluded and a NATO military presence in the area will continue for many years to come. The war has been neither swift nor, for the moment, particularly effective, but it has already been very costly.
Precise expenditure figures for the operation to date are almost impossible to compute, partly because the operation is multinational and part ly because weapon prices are notoriously volatile. The costs of replacing ammunition for, say, a Dutch aircraft are different from those in Italy, and many countries procure weapons at special prices, often supported through subsidies hidden in other budget items.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the offensive against Yugoslavia has already cost at least €1.7 billion, and this is even before the costs of transporting western troops to the region or feeding the Albanian refugees are factored in. The US administration is about to ask Congress for a separate credit line of $4 billion to finance the continuation of the war.
The complete dependence of the Europeans on US air transportation capacity and the massive movements of troops now taking place on the continent will strengthen the hand of military establishments, who have long demanded boosted defence budgets. They may not get additional money in the years to come, but will be protected against the defence cuts which many of Europe's centre-left governments originally planned.
The pressure to go ahead with many big-ticket procurement programmes for the military (especially heavy transport aircraft and satellite systems) will be particularly acute in Britain, Germany, France and Italy.
Nor is this the end of Europe's financial bill from the Balkans war. Given the immediacy of the crisis and its proximity, much of the European Union's aid budget will be redirected to the Balkans in the next few years. This will mean less aid for other poor countries, particularly in Africa and Central America, hardly a welcome development for international stability, especially since it is highly unlikely that either the US congress or the Japanese government (the two other potential sources of aid) will cover the shortfall.
At a hastily arranged EU summit this week, the German presidency spoke about some grand-sounding plans for the reconstruction of the Balkans. The Germans were wise not to be too specific about what they meant, for the reality is that nobody knows where the money will come from, and the Germans themselves remain most vociferous in wishing to reduce their financial contributions.
However, despite these imponderables, there is a certainty: the Americans will argue that it is for the Europeans to foot most of the bills, just as they have done since the end of the war in Bosnia earlier this decade. Congress in Washington has long believed that military glory naturally accrues to the US, while the humdrum business of feeding refugees should be left to others.
In the longer term, the handling of the Kosovo episode could have a serious impact on the US presidential elections outcome. The two main candidates in the elections know this well. Mr Al Gore, the Democratic chief contender, is a strong supporter of air strikes against Yugoslavia, but an opponent of a ground offensive. Mr George Bush, the Republican chief contender, has gingerly tried to stay outside the fray, but has now started to argue for a possible ground offensive.
Annoyingly for Mr Gore, victory in Kosovo is unlikely to improve his electoral chances by much, but a bad outcome (or one in which US forces suffer casualties), could hamper the Democrats' electoral chances a great deal.
Finally, relations with Russia will take a turn for the worse. Although the Russians managed to obtain a relatively small IMF credit recently, there is increasing opposition in all western countries to further credits. Moscow is now sending ships to spy on NATO forces, and is refusing to ratify many of the disarmament agreements already concluded with the West.
It will not take too long before the US Congress starts expressing public opposition to any credits for Russia, and before the Europeans themselves conclude that better relations with the Kremlin remain an impossibility. Europe will not return to the days of the Cold War, but the continent could return to a period of constant tensions with Moscow.
For the moment, however, the chief institutional investors who move financial markets remain blissfully unaware of these dangers, and western governments, eager to retain this atmosphere of calm, are not complaining either.
Jonathan Eyal is Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London