Mr Vojislav Kostunica has been recognised by all but the most stubborn supporters of Mr Slobodan Milosevic as Yugoslavia's president elect. For this reason he has refused to become involved in the runoff election scheduled by Yugoslavia's Federal Election Commission for October 8th.
There is little doubt that the "official" figures which show Mr Kostunica ahead after the first round - but falling short of the 50 per cent needed for outright victory - are the product of serious falsification. The mathematical progression of results emanating from the Milosevic camp has shown this to be the case.
At first the kite was flown that Mr Milosevic had polled more than 50 per cent. When this was shown to be beyond belief, the figure was revised to a narrow Milosevic win which necessitated a run-off against Mr Kostunica. This too lacked credibility and the commission then declared that Mr Kostunica had gained 48.22 per cent of the vote against Mr Milosevic's 40.23 per cent.
To change these "final" figures under pressure from the opposition would involve exploding the myth that the commission is an independent organisation immune from political influence and pressure. Court action to query the legitimacy of large numbers of votes may yet be taken. This course was taken in 1996 and 1997 after Mr Milosevic's allies had falsified the results of municipal elections. This in concert with massive demonstrations and other measures was enough to force the regime to concede defeat.
The issues at stake on this occasion are of a more serious nature. Mr Milosevic and his associates appear cornered and it is under circumstances such as these they can be at their most dangerous. A highly-paid and loyal paramilitary police force has been able to keep them in power throughout the series of crises that began with the dissolution of the old Yugoslav Federation. Mainly from rural areas loyal to Mr Milosevic, this heavily armed force has been the mainstay of the regime. The loyalty of the regular army is not as strongly guaranteed and the possibility of a civil war in Serbia cannot be completely ruled out.
There is a seductive argument which suggests that should Mr Milosevic pack his bags and leave the country all would be well. His departure would undoubtedly be a major step on the road to democracy and prosperity in Serbia. Unfortunately, however, he is simply the leading member of a very large group of corrupt politicians and businessmen who have profited from Yugoslavia's troubles.
There is little doubt that some members of this group, including his wife Ms Mirjana Markovic, are advising Mr Milosevic to brazen things out and "win" the second round of the elections at all costs. They will argue that after NATO's bombing campaign the opposition may have neither the determination nor the stamina to pursue a lengthy campaign of civil disobedience.
Mr Milosevic's family background - both his parents took their own lives - may have contributed to a lack of stability in his character. His response could be dangerous and defiant. Once again, therefore, the threat of serious violence and loss of life hangs over the volatile Balkan region. The accession to power of Mr Kostunica, despite his Serbian nationalist and frequently anti-western attitudes, would provide the optimum scenario. It is to be hoped that this can be achieved in the most peaceful manner possible.