The decision by the Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to give Mr Ryutaro Hashimoto a second term as LDP president - and hence remain on as prime minister - should suggest that the government's ambitious reform programme is still on track. However, the nature of the cabinet reshuffle indicates that the prime minister does not have a completely free hand.
Mr Hashimoto was returned unopposed partly because of his high standing in the opinion polls. The other reason no rival stood against him is because he neutralised opposition through cutting deals with party shoguns, the factional leaders who still retain much influence on policy-making and cabinet posts. A number of the cabinet appointments caused surprise but that of Mr Koko Sato was a shock. Eleven years ago, when he was a junior transport minister, Mr Sato was convicted of taking a £10,000 bribe from All Nippon Airways. Mr Hashimoto has made a virtue of leading an open and honest administration and of terminating the ties between "politics and dirty money". So why on earth did he bring Mr Sato into cabinet?
The reason is that the LDP's right wing needs to be pandered to if it is to support the reforms. This pandering carries a price. An opinion poll puts support for the new cabinet at only 28 per cent, compared with 50 per cent approval for the one it replaced. Three opposition parties are to table a motion of no confidence in Mr Sato and even government coalition parties have said he shouldn't have been appointed. After resolutely refusing to budge, Mr Sato hinted yesterday that he will offer his resignation after the weekend. Mr Hashimoto is now in a "can't win" situation. He will probably accept the resignation but the damage done to his authority will be considerable. In addition, the dumping of Mr Sato will worsen the enmities in his own party.
Disunity in the LDP is a real threat to the reforms. Some shoguns are less than pleased that the party is in coalition with centre-left parties and would prefer an alignment with the conservative New Frontier Party. Mr Hashimoto believes, quite rightly, that his programme has more chance of getting through within the existing coalition arrangement. The reform programme is formidable. Mr Hashimoto wants to deregulate energy, reform agriculture, open up the financial markets and shake up the bureaucracy. He is not afraid to take chances. Prior to becoming prime minister he was responsible for introducing sales tax and privatising the railways; both measures were deeply unpopular with vested interests. Making the government more accountable and less costly is the reform dearest to the prime minister's heart and that, incredibly, was the cabinet job given to Mr Sato. Mr Hashimoto's usually sound judgment seems to have deserted him.
In addition, his choice of foreign minister, Mr Keizo Obuchi, was a surprise. Although he is a staunch supporter of the prime minister, he is an unreconstructed nationalist. Mr Obuchi has to develop defence co-operation with the United States and secure Japan's position as Asia's policeman. To do this he must convince countries such as China and the Koreas that Japan wants only to be a neutral force for good. Such assurances of good intentions are likely to treated with circumspection when uttered by a man who says that Japan has nothing to apologise for in its World War II conduct.