WORLD VIEW: Reality of Norway's link with EU should provide UK Eurosceptics with a political reality check
Reuters, Oslo, Wed: Norway’s law limiting single ownership of fish farming concessions to a quarter of its total is in breach of European Economic Area rules, the authority that monitors the co-operation of non-EU states with the EEA has ruled . . .
IT’S CALLED having it both ways. Having your cake and eating it . . .
The idea – the delusion – is that the UK could walk away from the EU, its “bureaucracy” and “usurping of national sovereignty”, and regain its autonomy, simply retaining its trading relationship and free access to markets and capital.
A return, the Eurosceptics argue, to the essence of what the EEC allegedly once was – in fact, never was – a trading bloc with no political dimension.
Easy, they say. There’s already a model. A relationship like independent Norway’s, some have been increasingly suggesting, as they whip up Tory backbench demands for a referendum on membership.
The Tory leadership, insisting still it remains pro-membership, has already conceded the referendum principle if it fails to succeed in persuading EU partners to “repatriate” a somewhat nebulous host of powers from Brussels to London.
A closer look at the “Norwegian model”, however, might add a touch of realism to the debate. Indeed, the Norwegians would cheerfully provide Eurosceptics with a copy of a most useful and candid independent study of the country’s relationship with the EU which Oslo commissioned earlier this year, “Outside and Inside”. Its title reflects nicely the paradoxical relationship – both in and out: Norway enjoys both the benefits and costs of membership and non-membership.
Norway, along with Iceland, Liechtenstein and the 27 member states of the EU, forms part of the European Economic Area (EEA), a treaty-based, open, common market for all 30. But at a price.
To ensure a level playing field, non-EU members are required to align their market-related legislation – and that ranges widely, from competition to the environment to social policy – with that of the EU.
In practice this means that when Brussels passes new laws it faxes them to the three, who then put them on their statute books. They may be consulted, but have no say.
And there is no reason to believe the 26 remaining members of the EU would not insist on as much from a departing UK if it wanted to retain its free EEA-like access to EU markets. There is no such thing as a free lunch.
In Norway’s case – its five million people narrowly declined full membership twice in referendums in 1972 and 1994 – it has now adopted three-quarters of what is called the acquis communautaire, the body of EU laws and procedures that new members have to implement, amounting to 6,000 legislative Acts.
A third of all legislation currently on the Norwegian books is Brussels-mandated. (That includes, for example, the notorious working time directive, a particular bugbear for the Tory right and a key target for “repatriation”).
In truth, as the report points out, it is “an illusion” to consider Norway as outside the EU. “We are almost as deeply integrated as the UK,” committee chairman Prof Fredrik Sejersted says.
But while it sees the economic benefits as largely positive, the report expresses concern at the political consequences, as Norway is bound, in practice, to adopt EU policies “without voting rights”. The democratic deficit is the price the country pays for the privilege of its “independence with access”.
One of the central grievances of British Eurosceptics relates to the UK budget contribution and the country’s special rebate, a politically toxic running sore that has come to dominate every EU budget round.
Yet, little understood by them is the reality that Norway is also expected to contribute very substantially as a non-member to the social cohesion of the union, specifically in structural funding for the eastern European countries – currently some €340 million a year in EEA and Norway grants.
A comparable contribution by an “independent” UK, an economy about five times the size of Norway’s, would see it paying some €1.7 billion a year, a saving to the British exchequer of only about €1 billion on its current net contribution to the EU budget.
And, because it has specifically opted out of common agricultural and fisheries policies, Norway also faces tariffs on its exports to the EU of food and fish – 12 per cent in the case of smoked salmon. (It exported more than $5 billion (€4.1 billion) worth of salmon last year, two-thirds of it to other European countries).
The financial saving to the UK in going for EEA status would be a lot more modest than its proponents expect.
Norway’s relationship with the EU, warts and all, suits it – the close links and marching-in-step have strongly benefited the economy – and three-quarters of voters in a recent poll insist they still do not want to join.
It is hard to see, however, how the UK, which sends half its exports to the EU, could possibly benefit from a move in that direction. It would sacrifice a place at the EU decision-making table for, at best, a marginal cut in its legislative obligations.
But the lure of “sovereignty” and notional “independence”, however illusory, retains a powerful grip on British Tories’ psyches. The “Norwegian model”, however misunderstood, may still yet fly.