John Palmer/World View: The Convention on The Future of Europe is approaching its climax. Decisions which will shape the political character of the European Union for years to come can no longer be avoided.
Some of the questions are obvious. Will the Union be given the institutional capacity to function effectively with 25 and more member-states in future?
Can the EU summon up the political will to forge a serious common foreign, security and defence policy, or will world affairs be managed in effect by one superpower across the Atlantic?
Equally urgent is whether the European Union develops as a democratic polity in which its citizens take ownership of the European political process. The days when European integration can be driven from above by technocrats and diplomats are over.
The time has come to put democratic accountability at the heart of the new constitutional treaty.
But by accepting that future Commission presidents should continue to be appointed in much the same way as at present, the leaders of the convention risk dealing a deadly blow to the democratic legitimacy of the Commission and its essential role in safeguarding the collective European interest.
The system by which European Union heads of government select Commission presidents is indefensible.
It operates (in secret) on the "Buggins's Turn" principle where the nomination of the Commission president is rotated among the political families represented in the European Council. Transparent this system certainly is not.
The European Parliament is thus faced with a fait accompli and can only refuse to endorse the president chosen by the EU heads of government by risking a constitutional crisis.
It is not necessary to cite specific individuals who have occupied this post to make the point that strong and effective Commission presidents have emerged more in spite of, rather than because of, this system.
The obscure charade surrounding the appointment of the Commission president has nurtured the widespread perception - eagerly encouraged by europhobes - that the peoples of the European Union are "governed by unelected bureaucrats." Caricature this may be, but it is too close to the truth for comfort.
The convention praesidium has used some rather weasel words to describe the changes they now wish to see.
Reference is made to the European Parliament "electing" the Commission president. But this is simply not borne out by what would happen in practice.
Rather it will be for the European Council to choose its preferred candidate by majority vote and for the European Parliament simply to ratify or reject.
It is suggested that heads of government should take into account the results of the preceding European Parliament election, but no provision is made for voters to be given the opportunity to choose their preferred candidate in that election. It is essential that this approach be rejected by the convention as a whole.
Conventioneers should insist that the Commission president is elected by a simple majority of MEPs and - together with the new Commission team - is ratified by the European Council.
Does anyone seriously imagine that in 10 or 20 years an appointed Commission president will be able to defend the collective European interest and the integrity of the constitution in the face of politicians who will have a monopoly of democratic legitimacy?
This may be a matter of little or no concern to those EU governments which anyway want to marginalise the Commission and to erode the Community method of decision-making in favour of an increasingly "inter-governmental" Union dominated by a handful of big states.
But the great majority of EU member-states have a powerful interest in defending the integrity of the Commission.
Secondly, the election is essential to give serious political content to European Parliament elections.
Voter turnout in EP elections is in serious decline, and one important reason is that voters are not offered any serious choices about the future direction of the Union, and their vote anyway does not determine the character of the executive of the EU.
This is not true of any other parliamentary election in the democratic world.
By encouraging the embryonic Europe- wide political parties to put forward their respective candidates for the Commission Presidency for approval by the electorate, parties will be obliged to offer voters a real choice about the future direction the Union should take.
The alternative is a continued atrophy in the EP election until, eventually, it attracts so few voters that an elected Parliament is quietly abandoned.
There is, of course, plenty of room to debate the optimal arrangements for such an election. John Bruton has made a powerful case for a direct election of the Commission president, bypassing the European Parliament. But that is to presuppose that the development of the European constitution will be towards the United States presidential model rather than the European parliamentary model. Thus far there appears little support for a US-style president.
Others fear that an election would weaken the Commission by "politicising" it. But this ignores the fact that the Commission is, by virtue of its mandate, a political body. Indeed in future, as the Commission is given new responsibilities - for example, in the field of justice and internal security - it is bound to become more political, not less.
Nor would an election mean that the Commission would be made a "prisoner of the European Parliament" as some purists have suggested. MEPs can already abuse their powers to sack the entire Commission if they so wish. That is a risk democracy necessarily involves.
Both European and national parliamentarians share a common interest in strengthening the democratic life of the Union. Both will be losers if the European Union insists on trying to preserve the present, antiquated and discredited status quo.
The convention must declare itself unambiguously for future Commission presidents to be elected through the European Parliament.
John Palmer is political director of the European Policy Centre