The results of Iraq's elections have released a real political process of fundamental significance for the country's future, notwithstanding their evidently flawed pedigree.
The overall turnout, at 58 per cent of registered voters, compares well with long established democracies. It conceals much higher participation rates among Kurdish and Shia voters, and of secular ones in key centres, despite the minuscule involvement of Sunni communities in areas where the insurrection is strongest and where boycotts and intimidation prevented people voting.
The results set the scene for the formation of a representative transitional government capable of steering the country towards self-rule and for the work of an assembly which must decide on Iraq's future constitutional structure. These objectives can be successfully achieved if the politics of coalition-building and compromise are able to take hold during a continuing insurrection provoked by the US-led occupation of the country.
The elections presented a historic opportunity for several major groups to assert their interests and rights. It has been seized by the Shias and Kurds. Although Shias comprise some 60 per cent of the population, parties standing in their name secured 48 per cent of the votes, indicating there was a significant number of voters who preferred secular candidates.
Mr Iyad Allawi, the outgoing prime minister, who was appointed by US authorities, garnered some of this protest vote, but underperformed compared to expectations. In contrast the Kurdish alliance gained nearly 26 per cent of the vote on the back of an extraordinary 90 per cent turnout, giving it a pivotal role in governing and constitution-building.
The great political uncertainty of these results is the future of Iraq's Sunni community, some 20 per cent of the population, but long the culturally dominant group and now facing a very different future. Much of the military resistance is based in Sunni areas, but there are indications that a role will be offered to their representatives in government.
The agreed rules give Sunni provinces an effective veto on the constitution later this year. A clear strategy to separate them from the Islamic jihadists also involved in the resistance is required; but that will mean difficult compromise by the new government and the US-led coalition alike. The more clearly a perspective of US political and military disengagement from Iraq is set out the easier such a strategy will be to arrange.
These results seem to endorse a Shia-dominated transitional government in coalition with other parties. They leave a huge uncertainty over Iraq's political future. It will be a federal state, not a highly centralised one, if Kurdish aspirations for autonomy are to be satisfied. The future balance between Islamic and secular values is highly contentious. So are its relations with neighbouring Iran and Turkey. But with luck, goodwill and mature international engagement these challenges can be met.