With a third of the French electorate still undecided about how they will vote next month on the EU constitution, it is perhaps not surprising that opinion polls this week have varied widely in their assessment of the likely No vote - from a narrow 51 per cent on Wednesday in Le Parisien, down from 56 per cent a month ago, to a whopping 62 per cent yesterday in an internet poll by MarketTools research group.
All agree, however, that unless there is a dramatic re-engagement by the public and a shift in preferences, France appears likely to plunge the EU into a period of deep political uncertainty. And, as this paper's European Correspondent reports today, there is genuinely no "plan B" emerging from capitals and a deep sense of unease that a No in France may well be followed in quick succession by a similar vote in the Netherlands.
Yet, although the French will mark ballot papers Yes or No next month, the unfortunate truth is that the merits or deficiencies of the constitution are unlikely to be on their minds. For supporters of the European project, perhaps more frustrating than the prospect of an emerging predominance of euroscepticism in two founder states of the Union, is another reality: if France votes No it will have as much to do with anger at its political class, not least president Jacques Chirac, as with views on the constitution.
That frustration has been shamelessly played on, at Europe's expense, on both the left and right. The ambitious Nicholas Sarkozy, pretender to the Gaullist succession to Chirac, is widely seen as not having exerted himself to campaign for a Yes in the hope - it is said - that failure will see off prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin. And Laurent Fabius, the former Socialist prime minister, has campaigned against his own party's supportive position. Many believe his contention that the constitution does not go far enough is in reality all about positioning himself to be the next Socialist presidential candidate. He is certainly well aware that a French No cannot possibly result in a renegotiation producing "more Europe" in a revised constitution.
Indeed, the paradox that rejection may simultaneously be represented as a vote for "more Europe" and for "less Europe" (as well as being a vote for or against Jacques Chirac) highlights the limitations of the referendum as a mechanism. True, it may serve to educate and give voters a badly needed sense of ownership of the EU. But the voter can never be asked "when you say No, what do you really mean?" If France says No, the confusion of its partners will be genuine and the crisis for the EU real.