The Kosovo negotiations go into a decidedly higher gear now that the Kosovar delegation has indicated it is ready to sign the Rambouillet agreements. They are right to do so, for they gain much more than they lose from it. Their decision concentrates pressure on Serbia and its leader, Mr Slobodan Milosevic, to accept the presence of a NATO-led force to implement and police the Kosovo agreement. It also raises acutely the question of how credible NATO's threat of force is if he refuses to do so.
The Kosovar delegation's great fear was that they would compromise their commitment to independence by accepting the document, which does not mention that option explicitly in laying down a three-year time-scale for regional autonomy. Their political and military campaigns have successfully put the prospect of independence on the agenda and produced the offer of an autonomy deal much more radical than expected. Over the next three years there will be an opportunity to test it out. The Rambouillet accords provide for a 30,000 strong NATO-led force to implement and police them. There can be no doubt that this is an essential component of the agreement, given the repressive record of the Serb forces and the need to prevent them undermining it. a-vis the Kosovar Liberation Organisation. There is some leeway available in defining the force's structure and mandate so as to address Mr Milosevic's outright refusal so far to accept it on what he regards as Yugoslav sovereign territory.
If the force was to come under the auspices of the Partnership for Peace, it would be possible to include Russian troops and commanders. Given the fraught diplomatic context of NATO enlargement, this would be a highly desirable outcome. It would also endorse Russian diplomacy in the crisis and the legitimacy of that state's diplomatic involvement in the Contact Group along with the United States, France, Britain, Italy and Germany. Several of these states are reluctant to accept the use of force against Serbia if Mr Milosevic refuses to sign the agreement. As many commentators have pointed out, he is well able to exploit such disagreements to his own advantage. This puts such states as France and Italy in a very difficult position.
To approve air attacks on Serbia without explicit Security Council mandate would be to endorse US unilateralism and set precedents for future conflicts. It would also further antagonise Russia. But not to threaten Serbia with credible military retaliation should Mr Milosevic persist in his rejection of the agreement, could perpetuate the crisis with the risk that it would spread in the region. The need to threaten force has been accepted by the UN Secretary General, Mr Kofi Annan, even though an explicit resolution would invite Russian or Chinese vetoes at the Security Council. It is within these ambiguous parameters that the Contact Group, the European Union and NATO must work in coming days. Now that the Kosovars have accepted the agreement, their credibility and effectiveness will be put severely to the test.