The Middle East peace process has been written off many times in the last two years by onlookers and participants, but it has survived despite recurrent impasses and crises. These have revolved largely around the policies of personality of the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr Benjamin Netanyahu. Following the inconclusive summit in London this week, he faces the crucial decision on whether to accept the terms on offer from the US Secretary of State, Mrs Albright, for further negotiations in Washington next week, which have been accepted by the Palestinian leader, Mr Yasser Arafat. If Mr Netanyahu refuses to attend, he will have put paid to the Oslo agreements. If he accepts the American terms , there is much he can claim by way of victory. Mr Netanyahu derives his mandate from his victory over the Labour Party in the 1996 general election when he argued that his opponents could not guarantee Israeli security by the land-for-peace formula they had agreed with Mr Arafat. Since then, Mr Netanyahu has argued that terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians by Islamist groups have only reinforced his case and vindicated his hostile delaying tactics towards the Oslo accords. He can certainly claim that Israeli public opinion has swung in his direction despite his wafer-thin parliamentary majority. He has so constructed his right-wing coalition as to justify virtually continuous resistance to international pressure for the accords to be implemented.
In London, bargaining was conducted almost exclusively between the United States and the Israelis. Mr Arafat was on the margins, having accepted the reported US plan to transfer 13 per cent more West Bank land to the Palestinian authority, together with the commitment to enter immediately into the final stages of negotiations for a settlement of the conflict. If the details are confirmed, this plan represents a radical dilution of the Oslo accords, as to the timing and extent of Israeli withdrawal and probably also in respect of their agenda covering borders, refugees, resources, settlements and Jerusalem.
Were Mr Netanyahu to accept the offer of Washington talks, he could claim success in whittling down the Oslo commitments and in skipping over their complex phasing to reach final settlement talks. A great deal depends on how resolutely the Clinton administration insists on Israel accepting its plan. Washington has the power to confront Mr Netanyahu with the stark choice, if not to dictate his decision. If he seeks to bargain further on these terms, pleading political opposition or security concerns, he should be told this is not possible. Mr Arafat's credibility has been stretched to breaking point already.
If Mr Netanyahu's Government agrees to accept the terms on offer, the question still arises as to whether such a substantial revision of the Oslo accords is any longer compatible with the objective of Palestinian statehood. Anything less would contradict the whole thrust of Mr Arafat's Fatah movement over the last ten years. Already there are many ominous signs of Palestinian disenchantment with the peace process and strong indications that a renewed intifada would be much more violent than the last one. The Islamist rejectionists play directly into that mood. The process would certainly stumble on if the Israeli Government accepts the offer. It could be significantly revised if Mr Netanyahu decides to endorse it enthusiastically, faces down his domestic critics and attempts to shape the final agenda with renewed political confidence.