A last minute change of position by Iraq, accepting a reinstatement of United Nations arms inspections, has narrowly averted another United States attack in the dispute over arms inspections. President Clinton yesterday called off military action. But irresponsible brinkmanship will continue to deprive Iraq and its people of normal relations with the rest of the world. It is to be hoped, on their behalf, that this latest crisis can provoke a fundamental rethink about the dispute and its causes.
Iraq has now reinstated undertakings to allow intrusive inspection of its potential to produce weapons of mass destruction in a compromise agreement last February which averted military action at that time. On this occasion President Saddam Hussein's decision to cease co-operation with Unscom was provoked by impatience over whether compliance would ever lead to a lifting of sanctions, given the hostile attitude of the US. As always in this conflict Iraq and the US arrogate to themselves the right to take unilateral action. If Iraq truly wishes to see sanctions lifted it must comply fully with the UN agreements it has made on giving up biological and other weapons of mass destruction. If the US wants to take military action under UN auspices it must seek further sanction from the Security Council to do so.
Saddam Hussein's political miscalculations on this occasion saw him underestimate President Clinton's political capacity to respond firmly and rapidly following his strong showing in the congressional elections. He underestimated the willingness of Russia, France and China to countenance the US position and the measure of the Gulf States' support for Washington. Under the circumstances, the Iraqi president was left with no option but his decision on Unscom, in order to avoid a US attack and diplomatic isolation.
The elements of an acceptable compromise would combine full implementation of the Unscom mandate with a realistic prospect that UN sanctions could be lifted once it is complied with. For this to be achieved the US would have to show more willingness to compromise by reviewing its own policy of aggressive containment, including the option to remove Saddam Hussein from power by direct military action and confrontation or undermining him by supporting his domestic opponents.
But he is more likely to be undermined by normalising international relations with Iraq, rather than by aggressive containment or subversion which always allows him the role of national defender of his people. They are not going to develop the confidence to challenge his dictatorship until they have an opportunity to recover from the dreadful damage imposed by the sanctions regime.