The great paradox about the 1990-91 Gulf War remains the contrast between its decisive military and indecisive political outcomes. Ten years ago a formidable military machine was assembled over several months under United States leadership which achieved a noteworthy victory over the Iraqi invasion force that had occupied Kuwait.
Having accomplished the objective of rolling back the invasion, the allied forces called a ceasefire and in due course withdrew from Iraqi territory, leaving President Saddam Hussein and his regime still in power and the Iraqi state still territorially intact. There was no attempt to use military advantage to topple the Iraqi leader by capturing Baghdad, despite recurrent rhetoric from Western leaders that such an outcome would be highly desirable. The elimination of Saddam Hussein has been accurately described as more of a war hope than a war aim. In that perspective the fact that he is still in office ten years on looks less paradoxical in the light of the famous military victory.
Those ten years have been disastrous for the Iraqi people and their culture and for the country's socio-economic development. Much of that disaster must be laid at the door of Saddam Hussein and his oppressive regime. Their attacks on the country's Kurdish and Shia minorities and their ruthless dealings with opponents have continued unabated. Their failure to co-operate with United Nations arms inspections closed off opportunities to reopen international relations.
In a further paradox, the regime's acceptability to the Iraqi population has been sustained by the effectiveness of the economic sanctions deployed against Iraq by the UN, led most determinedly by the US and Britain. These are unprecedented in their impact on the civilian population and have resulted in shameful rates of child mortality and disintegration of the country's standards of living. A broken population is unable to resist the regime and unwilling to do so when it can plead justifiably that a whole people is being targeted.
There is an opportunity in coming weeks and months for the UN to deploy a new arms inspection team and for the Iraqi leadership to respond constructively to it. That would make the task of the increasing numbers of states which favour a relaxation of the sanctions to argue their case easier and more convincing. If the Iraqi people are to confront the regime they must be given the chance to do so through recovering their self-confidence by rebuilding their infrastructure and resources. That, alas, will be a long and painful process even if more favourable circumstances emerge.