It is clear that we are now entering the final stretch of the Northern Ireland peace negotiations. It is make-or-break time, and it is clear none of the protagonists wants to be seen to be responsible for a breakdown. Most of them seem actively concerned for the talks to move speedily into their final stage.
Doubts have, of course, been expressed about Sinn Fein's position. Some people have been propounding a Machiavellian interpretation of the recent IRA murders, seeing them as a ploy by Sinn Fein to secure its expulsion from talks with which it had appeared to become uncomfortable.
Like most complicated conspiratorial explanations of political events, however, this theory has not stood up. For, whatever may be Sinn Fein's ultimate intentions with regard to the kind of settlement likely to emerge from this process, the leadership clearly wants to remain in the talks, and is in fact prepared to face down significant dissent within the Sinn Fein/IRA family in order to get back in there for the final stage.
Last week the party made the most of the opportunity presented by suspension from the talks to portray itself, implausibly, as a victim of an alleged unionist plot, to which apparently the Irish and the British governments had willingly lent themselves! It overdid this propaganda exercise, however, getting itself out on a limb by not only demanding yet another visit to Downing Street but by also suggesting it was going to lay down new preconditions for a return to the talks.
Earlier this week that ploy received short shrift from both the Taoiseach and John Hume, and the Sinn Fein leadership rapidly adjusted its stance to the reality of this situation.
The truth is that, while skilled at propaganda and well-versed in how to tug at the heart-strings of a small soft-headed, as well as soft-hearted, minority of opinion in this State, Sinn Fein's long self-exclusion from the political process has deprived it of the kind of sensitivity to middle-ground opinion that is second nature for most democratic politicians.
But such errors of judgment should not obscure the determination and skill, and indeed the courage, with which the Sinn Fein leadership has pursued its objective of moving the IRA, as well as its political activists, towards accepting, or at any rate tolerating non-violently, a form of settlement that will inevitably fall short of its traditional objective.
Moreover, in marked contrast to the constitutional unionist parties, Sinn Fein has been strikingly careful to avoid impaling itself on non-realisable hooks.
Gerry Adams's formulation of Sinn Fein's objectives in these talks has increasingly been expressed in terms that seem potentially compatible with what the two governments, the SDLP and possibly also the parties representing the two main loyalist paramilitary organisations seem now to envisage. And these are terms that many constitutional unionists would wish to see endorsed by the parties for which they vote.
Sinn Fein's emphasis has, in fact, moved away from its traditional demand for a united Ireland now, an aspiration that has recently been expressed in terms of a more long-drawn-out political process, and it has identified as more immediate goals such issues as non-discrimination against the minority, equal treatment and parity of esteem, and a reform of policing.
These Sinn Fein efforts to prepare the way for a possible settlement find few parallels among the constitutional unionist parties. The DUP and UK Unionists are, of course, unremittingly hostile to any settlement.
For its part the Ulster Unionist Party continues to give the public impression of being fixated by fears of being outflanked by its two intransigent rivals for the soul of constitutional unionism, to an extent that has rendered it incapable of giving serious consideration to the attainment of its essential objective of a stable Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, bolstered by constitutional provisions based on the principle of consent.
Such an objective now seems achievable, if certain necessary concessions are made to the nationalist minority. But instead of seeing such concessions positively as the key to securing their essential objective, unionist politicians' fears lead them to see almost any concession as under mining this very objective.
Sinn Fein, of course, does not accept the consent principle, but there is clearly a good chance now that if, even in the face of possible opposition from it, a settlement based on this principle were to be adopted by the people of Ireland in a referendum carried out North and South on the same day in early May, a Sinn Fein/IRA rejection of such a settlement after its endorsement might thereafter take a non-violent form.
It is also possible, of course, that Sinn Fein could be thinking of putting the cat among the pigeons by calling on nationalists to reject in the proposed referendum a settlement they judged to be unsatisfactory, hoping that, in combination with a similar call to the unionist electorate by Dr Paisley and Robert McCartney, a majority could be forged against it in Northern Ireland.
This hope might well be frustrated by the negative impact on each community of opposition to the settlement from the more extreme elements in the other. However that might be, what is now abundantly clear is that, one way or the other, Sinn Fein is trying to avoid a return to violence.
Even if in the face of a settlement Sinn Fein/IRA regarded as unacceptable the IRA were to return to violence, for unionists and for constitutional nationalists a settlement of the kind now in sight is nevertheless an objective worth pursuing.
This is all the more true because such a betrayal of the peace process, as nationalists North and South would certainly see it, would create an unprecedented degree of solidarity between the two Irish traditions in opposition to such renewed violence. Thus, for unionists an agreed settlement based on the consent principle would be an excellent two-way bet.
As to the terms of a settlement, it should be clear that what unionists need above all is a police force that nationalists fully accept and will work with, restoring law and order to ghetto areas where the RUC cannot now operate.
And what they, and indeed the people of Northern Ireland generally, also need are the economic benefits they would secure from North-South joint action on a basis of equality in those sectors where we in this State have built up particular strengths over decades of independence.
For, as well as boosting industrial development, export sales and tourism, to give just three examples, such joint action, like reform of the police, would also bring a bonus in the form of readier Northern nationalist acceptance of Northern Ireland remaining within the UK.
There are many non-political unionists who recognise the force of these considerations. There are also such people in the Ulster Unionist Party, but that party has been skilful at concealing the existence of such rational calculations of enlightened self-interest within its own ranks.
To what extent is the failure of the UUP even to hint at such thought processes the product of a belief that it must not open up chinks in its armour vis-a-vis the DUP and UK Unionists until the final outcome of the talks is announced?
Or does it perhaps reflect an unwillingness even within the UUP negotiating team to face the reality of the kind of terms they will need to agree if they are not to carry within Ireland, in Britain, and worldwide, the stigma of having precipitated the collapse of a process in which three sovereign governments and many political parties have made a huge investment?
The worst case of all from the point of view of unionism would be for the UUP negotiators to fail even to recognise this dilemma, and for them to rely on Sinn Fein to save their bacon by collapsing the process.
It is, I suppose, remotely possible that some UUP negotiators have deluded themselves that this would offer them a way out. But if that is the case, they would urgently need to rethink their position, for it now seems clear that Sinn Fein has no intention of obliging them in this way.
If on the other hand the UUP negotiators are, in fact, preparing for an agreement on the kind of terms that are available to them, they would, I believe, be unwise to continue failing to prepare their activists, and unionist opinion generally, for such an outcome. The shock effect of an agreement for which UUP opinion had been in no way prepared could be highly dangerous for that party, and for Northern Ireland.
It is always tricky to write about an evolving situation of this kind without knowing what is happening behind the scenes. But it seems unnatural to remain silent about these issues at a when we are so near a point of decision which future generations will certainly see as one of the major turning points in the history of this island.