The key elements of a possible Northern settlement, to some version of which all parties seem to me to have subscribed by virtue of their decision to join in the current talks, include: unambiguous commitment to the principle that Irish unity can come about only with the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland; a form of power-sharing in the future Northern Ireland governmental system; changes in the Northern Ireland policing system; amendments to Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution; closer Anglo-Irish relations; Cross-Border institutions, some of which will have the power to run their own affairs under the general supervision of the two administrations.
Our public opinion is at present alert to only one of the latter three elements - the one to which in the event of a settlement the electorate would have to give its consent - viz. amending Articles 2 and 3., and have not been the subject of any discussion or debate.
Yet it seems certain that if these bodies are to be sufficiently significant to motivate Northern nationalists to accept, and to work constructively within, a Northern Ireland that would be remaining more or less indefinitely within the United Kingdom, the establishment of these joint bodies must involve the transfer of important functions from the control of our Government to joint and equal control by our State and the new Northern Ireland power-sharing administration. Now, to the extent that unionists can be brought to accept such bodies, it will clearly be because, over and beyond their symbolism for nationalists, the transfer of executive functions by our State to these bodies would actually bring significant concrete benefits to Northern Ireland - benefits which may to some extent accrue to the North at our expense.
Given this reality, it is remarkable there has been no discussion here about developments that could involve a significant sharing of our control over important areas of our economic and cultural life. According to the Framework Document, the areas where we would concede a sharing of our power could include bodies covered by the following headings: (The examples given under each of these heading are, however, my own, and are included here for illustrative purposes.)
Marketing and promotional activities abroad (An Bord Tracht ala, An Bord Bia, Bord Failte);
Culture and heritage (Craft Council of Ireland, Arts Council, National Heritage Council, National Monuments, Wildlife Service);
Sectors involving a natural or physical all-Ireland framework (Coillte, Teagasc, Geological Survey, Ordnance Survey);
EU programmes and initiatives.
This last area could be particularly significant, for the Framework Document states that the proposed North-South inter-ministerial body would be responsible for the joint implementation and management of EU policies and programmes, including joint submissions, monitoring and implementation. While there is considerable ambiguity in this part of the Framework Document as to how far such co-operation might extend, it does not seem to exclude any part of our relations with the Union.
Now, because so many of Northern Ireland's EU interests coincide with ours rather than with those of Britain, we might find ourselves coming under pressure from a Northern Ireland power-sharing administration to share a large proportion of this most important part of our foreign policy.
Here, as I believe in certain other areas such as industrial promotion, a settlement in Northern Ireland might well involve, or might at least be followed by, a serious challenge to the unconscious assumption by most people in this State that we can rely on Northern unionists so to minimise North/South institutional links as to leave us undisturbed in our comfortable, partitioned - and in many ways partitionist - State.
To drive home this point I quote from a paper delivered several years ago to the Institute of European Affairs by Sir David Fell, then Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service.
Sir David remarked in his paper that he had heard it said the interests of Northern Ireland and our State are so similar that the island should be treated as a single entity at least for the purpose of some aspects of Northern Ireland's relationship with the European Union.
He went on to accept that it could be argued that on some issues Northern Ireland's interests might be more closely aligned with those of the Republic and on others with those of Great Britain, and that therefore "a Northern Ireland administration would be in the best possible situation if it could choose, issue by issue, in some form of variable geometry, whether to align itself with the Irish of British position - the best of both worlds".
Sir David then asked a series of pointed questions about how such an arrangement might work. "How might North/South structures represent Northern Ireland's interests when they would be composed of nationals of two separate member-states? How would the institutions of the European Community themselves react to such a development?
"How would a single case to Europe be constructed? Would its contents and priorities, in so far as they relate to both North and South, need to be agreed by both administrations? Presumably so. But what would happen if total agreement was not possible?"
And then came the key challenge to our seriousness in this matter - for Sir David asked a question that no one here has yet been prepared to address: "Could two administrations North and South contemplate, politically and practically, devolving or delegating the management of the relationship with European institutions to some form of North/South body?"
The reality that has not yet impinged on most people on both sides of the Border is that for Northern Ireland such bodies can involve no loss of power, for the simple reason that the North at present has no power to control its own affairs or to pursue its own interests. By contrast these bodies would involve an equal sharing of our sovereignty with the North.
And, given the remarkable absence of any public or political discussion of these matters in this State, it is not unreasonable for a Northern Ireland civil servant to have asked whether we are prepared for such a radical change.
On quite another front, a notable omission from the Framework Document list of matters that might come under joint North/South executive control is "industrial development". This is firmly relegated by the Framework Document to the "harmonisation" category rather than the "executive" category of North/South issues.
While there seems already to be close North/South co-operation in respect of the promotion of exports, there has always been intense competition between North and South in respect of industrial promotion.
Yet this is clearly the area where Northern Ireland would have most to gain from a joint operation - for our industrial promotion efforts have been much more sophisticated and successful than those of the IDB in Northern Ireland. If we were to insist on excluding industrial promotion from joint executive action, this would be seen by Northerners, both nationalist and unionist, as telling evidence of Southern partitionism, and of a lack of seriousness about the process now under way.
If we wish to be taken seriously we should make it clear that we would be willing to transfer the industrial promotion function from the harmonisation category to the executive one.
FOR more than one reason, this issue of the transfer of our control over these areas to a North/South body needs to be discussed here openly.
First of all, public opinion in this State needs to be prepared for such radical changes, which in certain circumstances we might have to face within six months. Second, such a discussion might alert unionists to the fact that, far from such joint executive bodies being a threat to them, it is we, rather than they, who will have to share the control that we now exercise over such matters.
Moreover, public discussion could bring to unionist attention the fact that it is Northern Ireland rather than our State that will tend to be the beneficiary of such changes - simply because in most, although in not all, of these sectors our affairs are today organised on a larger scale, and more effectively, than is the case in Northern Ireland.
Third, public discussion of these matters here would also send a signal to Northern nationalists that we are serious about North/South institutions - which at present many of them are tempted to doubt.
And finally, I know from my own experience that if some of our civil servants and public bodies - who tend, perhaps understandably, to be State-oriented - are to be persuaded to respond positively to this potential challenge, it will be necessary for them to come under some pressure, not just from the Government - which, I know, has now begun to address this matter - but also from public opinion.