ANALYSIS:After theatre of Afghan peace conference, a real process to engage the insurgents must begin, writes MICHAEL SEMPLE
KABUL IS playing host to a multimillion-dollar exercise in political theatre. The consultative peace jirga, which suspected militants tried to rocket attack yesterday, is supposedly an opportunity to evolve a consensus for pursuing peace with the Taliban. The trouble is that the Afghans taking part are those who are already at peace with their government.
The real challenge is how to win the argument within the Taliban movement, not that in the government camp. Peace depends on winning over tens of thousands of young Afghans who have taken up arms against the government. None of those young men will be present in the jirga this week.
Afghanistan certainly needs peace. A US army, flagged as Nato, is defending the Afghan government from an Islamist insurgency, in the name of excluding al-Qaeda. The death toll is running at about 500 foreign troops per year, 2,500 civilians and an unknown number of Taliban, possibly in the thousands.
The majority of the 1,400 jirga delegates have been handpicked as reliable figures by the government’s provincial governors round the country. They will listen to pro-peace speeches and appeals to the Taliban to stop fighting. Then in some 50 small group discussions, everyone will get a chance to have their views noted down.
A final communique will endorse the government’s efforts for peace. Organisers will strive to maintain the classic Afghan blend of pomp and folk informality. At the end of the week delegates can go home buoyed by a sense of participation in grand events and armed with their official gift boxes (perfume and turbans for the men). Foreign diplomats can telegram capitals declaring another success in Afghanistan.
The jirga logic is that the government needs a popular mandate to tell the Taliban that President Karzai is the one to deal with. If the Taliban do not take up the various offers, the government can continue its military campaign from the safety of the moral high ground.
But the logic is flawed. The gathering has no legal status and therefore can give no formal mandate. The main concrete proposal that the government has is a policy document on “peace and reintegration” to be offered to Taliban fighters who tire of the fight. But the president already has executive authority to press ahead with it. And the Taliban have often rejected any plan based on tamely laying down arms and accepting the constitution. The plan dodges difficult questions entailed in a political settlement, like how to wind down a conflict, address grievances and refashion the administration and security forces. Afghans have made the obvious point that the jirga cannot establish consensus while one side is absent.
There are also risks. Does the government still have the prestige required to choreograph successfully? There is plenty of sentiment against the official script. If delegates lunge into Islamist-nationalist rhetoric, call for a unilateral end to Nato military operations or condemn Pakistani sponsorship of the Taliban or even lambast Afghan government corruption, it could undo the government team’s attempts to demonstrate a consensus around this official script.
Karzai might be loath to invest political capital in defending Nato operations or Pakistan against such outbursts. However, Karzai’s government does still depend upon the Nato prop and will have to live with Pakistan long after Nato has gone. For Karzai to conjure a usable mandate from the event he will have to employ all his showmanship skills to avoid simply showcasing Afghan residual hostility to the US, UK and Pakistan.
After the theatre somebody has to get on with the business of persuading those fighting the insurgency that they have a stake in peace. Firstly the Kabul government and Nato have to restore regime security credibility – convincing Afghans that the security forces and financing are in place to ensure the system will survive beyond the point where President Obama starts pulling out US troops.
Secondly, anyone who expects to be able to win over young men fired up with a sense of Islamic justice will have to demonstrate a bit of integrity themselves. For the regime, that means shedding its kleptocratic image.
Thirdly, a credible international mediator is needed to start doing the actual persuading and building confidence with the insurgents.
Fourthly, there has to be something more serious on the table – a workable political deal which shows how those who sided with the insurgency after 2001 really can become part of the political system.
Fifthly, Pakistan has to be on board.
Afghanistan is not the first conflict situation where peacemakers must address tough issues of religion, justice, power and politics. But until these items are addressed, young and desperate Afghan men will seek paradise by hurling themselves at Nato patrols and government outposts. None of them will be paying much attention to this week’s jirga.
Michael Semple is a regional specialist on Afghanistan and Pakistan, formerly with both the UN and EU. He is a fellow at the Carr Centre for Human Rights at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.