The capture of Saddam Hussein by US troops near Tikrit this weekend is undoubtedly a historic event in Iraq and has been widely and justifiably welcomed there and throughout the world. It is a great boost for the morale of the coalition troops in Iraq and politically for President Bush going into an election year.
But it remains to be seen whether his capture marks a decisive turning point in the US-led effort to reconstruct Iraq, bring it security, quell the insurgency and return sovereignty to its people.
November was the worst month so far for coalition forces in Iraq, when the rate of deaths and casualties suffered by US troops became greater than during the Vietnam war. American spokesmen have consistently linked Saddam Hussein to the resistance, assuming he is co-ordinating it and that his supporters are its main protagonists.
Mr Bush yesterday repeated the unsubstantiated allegation that Saddam and his regime have links with al-Qaeda. So Saddam's capture is being interpreted as a decisive defeat for those who violently oppose the occupation, even though Mr Bush said it should not be expected to lead to an immediate end to the violence. There is considerable evidence that the resistance is much more broad-based, going beyond Saddam loyalists and Islamist movements; if that is so his capture may not change things greatly for the better, even if he has been humiliated by yesterday's events. He does not appear to have had the capacity to orchestrate the insurgency.
Much will depend on how the fledgling Iraqi legal authorities and the governing council handle the forthcoming trial and respond to the new political circumstances. They say a trial is to be public and conducted according to internationally accepted norms. Saddam is reported to be defiant, rejecting blame for the Halabja massacres, the lethal war with Iran in the 1980s in which two million people died, the invasion of Kuwait, oppressive UN sanctions in the 1990s and the US-led invasion.
Iraqis are delighted to see him in custody, but realise that, in itself, this will not solve the problems they face. There is a growing demand that their sovereignty be restored, which must be considered alongside the US commitment to transfer control decisively back to Iraqi authorities by the end of June next year. Given the pitifully slow progress made in restoring public infrastructure and recruiting and training army and police services, this is a major challenge. The same can be said about political, administrative and economic resources.
The governing council has been ineffective, partly because the occupation authorities have been reluctant to trust it with extra powers. The resistance looks increasingly like a struggle for control of Iraq between Sunni, Shia and Kurdish forces in anticipation of US departure. Iraq will not be stabilised unless there is a major internationalisation of its political and military control through the United Nations, which would allow funds to flow for its redevelopment.