The Middle East peace process has encountered yet another, major obstacle following the Israeli government's decision to go ahead with a big housing scheme in east Jerusalem and the failure of an appeal against it in the country's supreme court. Palestinian and neighbouring Middle Eastern states talk once again in dire terms of a crisis in the process and the danger of reverting to the status quo ante the Oslo peace accords. In response, the Israeli government now proposes that the Oslo agenda be dramatically speeded up, putting into the next six months what had been previously planned to do over two years.
Not surprisingly, the Arab states smell a rat. It has been broadly acknowledged by advisors to the Israeli prime minister, Mr Netanyahu, that one of the prime reasons for so speeding up the negotiations, is because the handing back of land to the Palestinian Authority on the occupied West Bank is putting Israel at a disadvantage. In that case, the decision to go ahead with the 6,500 unit housing development in east Jerusalem - looks very much like a pre emptive move to rebalance the playing field in Israel's favour. This makes the proposal to speed up talks almost a non starter, except, perhaps as a gesture to international opinion which has been uniformly hostile to the latest housing development.
The Netanyahu government is clearly sensitive to this opinion, notably that in the United States and Europe. But it is well aware that the US vetoed a recent Security Council resolution condemning the Hard Homah development, while the European Union has certainly not mounted anything more that a verbal condemnation of it. The regional opposition in the Middle East is much more robust and hostile, but with what effect? Once again an Israeli fact accomplished on the ground, puts Mr Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority on the defensive; what else is new in the history of Israeli Arab relations?
Such a cynical interpretation of Mr Netanyahu's motives puts it realistically in a long tradition of Israeli negotiating behaviour. But it seriously underestimates the importance of the breakthrough achieved in Oslo - the creation of trust between the negotiating partners, based on a shared understanding of the probable shape of an eventual settlement. Mr Netanyahu's unexpected victory in last summer's elections broke that trust and that understanding. It posed the question of whether his government really wants to negotiate in good faith based on the Oslo accords.
He faced a stark choice between confrontation and compromise based on a land for peace formula which he had previously rejected. Many observers felt that the agreement on Hebron in January shifted the balance of political forces in Israel back towards the Oslo accords and away from the rejectionist currents with which Mr Netanyahu had identified, and the extreme settler movements which seemed to be driving his policy. They saw a realignment of Israeli policy based on a converging approach between the major parties and away from the minority parties which can reinforce their positions in coalition making.
They have had to revise their opinions radically in the light of the east Jerusalem housing scheme, which flies in the face of the spirit of the Oslo accords. It still remains to be seen whether this is. a hurdle or a real obstacle in the peace process, an indication that Mr Netanyahu's coalition cannot realign itself towards the Oslo formula and that the Palestinians and Arab states will revert to a much more hostile approach to Israel.