There should be no underestimation of the potential for disaster which is building over the decommissioning of weapons in Northern Ireland. As the moment for the creation of a shadow executive draws near, party leaders within the Assembly privately acknowledge their deepening concern at a loss of impetus in the setting up of new institutions. Later this week the Taoiseach meets Mr David Trimble to explore possible ways forward. Meanwhile, the First Minister is being circled by political predators who sense their best opportunity since the June elections to drag him down.
David Trimble declares that he will not sit in a shadow executive with Sinn Fein members until decommissioning has begun. Sinn Fein insists that it has an unqualified entitlement under the Belfast Agreement to take its places within such an executive, since the Agreement does not require decommissioning to be completed for two years. It is clear that the letter of the Agreement supports Sinn Fein's case. But this is not a problem which can be resolved by reference to the legal texts alone. The political sands are threatening to shift under Mr Trimble's feet and he is increasingly in danger of being outflanked and undermined by his enemies. It may be argued that Mr Trimble has actively helped in the construction of the trap in which he finds himself. The position he now holds on decommissioning has been defined by a succession of statements which brought him significantly beyond the terms of the Agreement. But it can equally well be argued that had he not done so he might not have secured even the small majority of unionist votes he did in May. A great many waverers were persuaded to back the Agreement by Mr Trimble's assurances on decommissioning and indeed by the famous letter which Mr Blair issued on the eve of polling.
On the other side of the equation it is widely felt that Sinn Fein simply may not be in a position to deliver on decommissioning at this time. The conviction is held, for instance, among certain of the loyalist paramilitaries (who are in no rush to surrender their own weapons) that the balance of power within the Provisional movement could swing dramatically against Mr Gerry Adams and his lieutenants if they sought to force the pace on the surrender of weapons and explosives. The outlines of a potentially lethal deadlock, creating a grave threat to the fledgling Assembly and the new institutions, are thus defined.
It is disquieting to recognise the extent to which hopes seem to be pinned on General John de Chastelain. The expectation is that the General will somehow persuade the unionists that their principles have been met, while convincing the paramilitaries that their cherished weaponry has not begun to move out of their control. He has some room to manoeuvre by virtue of Mr Martin McGuinness's appointment to his body - hopefully he has been appointed to get on with the business rather than to engage the General in parlour games. Structures and arrangements for decommissioning can be discussed and agreed. Some informed sources say that once decommissioning begins it could be completed within a few weeks.
But what if General de Chastelain cannot square the circle? The players on Northern Ireland's new political stage have some hard thinking to do. If David Trimble is brought down through the Provisionals' obduracy, who will Mr Adams and Mr McGuinness then be obliged to deal with in his place? Similarly, if Mr Adams and his colleagues were to lose control of the Provisionals, with whom would Mr Trimble find himself invited to sit? And if the threatened deadlock comes about, where do Dublin and London look for an alternative to what was agreed through the vote of the Irish people on May 22nd? This is to think of plunging into the abyss. But the abyss is there.