The outcome of the British general election and the mandate given to the next British government is of importance to Ireland, even if the contest appears not very exciting, writes Martin Mansergh.
Neighbouring and partner governments generally prefer "the devil they know", rather than having to build up relationships with a new and unfamiliar team.
Albert Reynolds as taoiseach was glad to see John Major back as prime minister in 1992. Regardless of ideology or European affiliations, it is doubtful if there are many in the Oireachtas who would not prefer to see the Labour government of Tony Blair returned next week.
We have, of course, an interest in effective government abroad, able to take decisions. The change of government in 1997 in Britain was welcome here, because of expectations that Labour would be able to move the Northern Ireland peace process forward again and play a more positive role in the EU.
The entire EU has an interest in a German government after elections next year being able to carry through the necessary reforms to restore its economy.
If Tony Blair is returned for a third term with a comfortable but perhaps smaller majority, it will enable the partnership with Bertie Ahern to continue long enough to secure full implementation of the Belfast Agreement, provided the parties make that feasible. The two governments are also allies against EU corporate tax harmonisation.
John Major's precarious Westminster situation gave the Ulster Unionists leverage to stave off serious political negotiations for three years. The large Labour majority since 1997, coupled with Tory party disarray, has meant that majority unionism, now with the DUP, has had no alternative but to deal with Blair.
Revival of an opposition alliance with the Tories on the model of 1912-14 has not been a realistic or promising option.
To be fair, bipartisanship on Northern Ireland at Westminster has been largely maintained. The Tories support the Belfast Agreement, which, after all, is largely built on the Framework Document of February 1995 put forward by John Major and John Bruton, who inherited a very advanced draft from the Reynolds/Spring administration.
Traditional Tory security instincts would be similar to those volubly expressed by Justice Minister Michael McDowell. While no party in the Oireachtas outside of Sinn Féin disputes the vigour of his approach, its duplication from the other side of the water, unless equally applied to active loyalist paramilitaries who live exclusively under British jurisdiction as well as republican ones, might be a bit too much of a good thing.
Ireland certainly has grounds to fear a Tory government from a European perspective. A Britain marginalised completely within the EU, or moved out to associate status, would be an unwelcome complication.
As it is, British euro membership has been long-fingered, without, however, any obvious negative effects on Ireland. Gordon Brown's economic chauvinism focuses on France and Germany, and ignores Ireland's very positive experience.
The basis of British Eurosceptic fears of a centralised and dirigiste European bureaucracy is in complete contradiction with the basis of French Euroscepticism, that sees in the EU constitution the triumph of neo-liberal "Anglo-Saxon" capitalism, shorn of social protections. Both caricatures cannot be true. In fact, neither are.
The trump cards being deployed against Blair are of doubtful value. Many voters dislike or are unmoved by attempted exploitation of immigration for electoral gain.
There is nothing surprising in the attorney general's initially hedged advice to Tony Blair on the legality of the Iraq war, and the issue has already been thrashed to death.
Most people have long since concluded that the over-enthusiastic advocacy of the war in Iraq (in order to keep Britain close by the side of the US) stretched truthfulness to the limit.
Whether it will deter Labour voters and make enough converts to the Liberal Democrats to compensate for their leader Charles Kennedy's muddle over his party's policy on higher taxes is uncertain.
One winner may be further apathy. The more predictable and boring first-past-the-post system does not begin to give the British (and Northern Ireland) voter the power and range of choice of PR-STV.
In Northern Ireland it is a matter of complete indifference here whether the Rev William McCrea or David Burnside wins South Antrim. Genuine pro-Agreement Ulster unionism is now thin on the ground, and there may be as much to hope from a DUP that does not have to look over its shoulder too much.
Paisley taking office in or after his 80th year would outdo even the Pope. The spectacle of Lord Molyneaux and the Rev Martin Smyth backing DUP candidates is about as edifying as the spectacle of Tim Healy backing Sinn Féin in 1918 against his erstwhile colleagues in the Irish Parliamentary Party.
Whether southern parties' solidarity with the SDLP impresses nationalist voters remains to be seen. The possible loss of any nationalist voice in the Westminster parliament should be a matter of some concern.
A British government preoccupied with its EU and G8 presidencies will have less time for bilateral prime ministerial meetings on the interminable difficulties of a stalled Northern Ireland political process.
A legitimate question that might be asked of the Sinn Féin leadership is why Gerry Adams was only able to undertake his recent initiative vis-a-vis the IRA so late. The often hardball and inflexible negotiating tactics employed since 1998 share a lot of responsibility for the political mess and loss of momentum that now exists, leaving much ground to be made up to regain trust.
Unionism is under little pressure, and has succeeded for the moment in its objective of getting off the hook of having to share power with republicans.
A conundrum to many people outside the North is why the anticipated winners in both communities deserve a large electoral reward. But it is in the nature of politics that any comfort zone won is shortlived. Pressure to make democratic politics work will shortly be resumed.