There is an inevitability to both the shape and instability of the latest Minsk peace agreement for Ukraine. It arises from the realpolitik that the European states are not prepared to confront Russia militarily – unless it actually threatens Nato territory – and can only therefore contain Vladimir Putin's ambitions, not thwart them. That the balance of forces is such that Ukraine itself can not defeat Russian intervention. And to the unstated calculation that Putin now wants to improve relations with the west and that his ambitions, inasmuch as they can be divined, are actually limited – neither substantially to expand the territory under "rebel" control nor to annexe eastern Ukraine.
A messy compromise which freezes the new status quo is the best available in the circumstances, however disappointing to allies in Kiev – a “Munich” for our times, some say – and however much it appears to reward Russian misconduct.
The hope is that the fragile ceasefire, its pullback of heavy weapons and its 140 km demilitarised corridor may allow a space in which elements of a longer-term deal can be done. Its broad shape already appears clear, although getting there will involve steering through a political minefield – Uraine will retain sovereignty over the full territory, de jure if not de facto, its borders controlled by its own forces, Kiev will have to grant very substantial autonomy to rebel-controlled areas ...
The Minsk agreement also has much broader significance. It represents the formalisation of a European security policy that tacitly, albeit unhappily, acknowledges a Russian prerogative in “zones of influence” from the old Soviet Union, and that accepts as a reality the continued stalemates in “frozen conflicts” in places like Georgia and Moldova. Inasmuch as it is prepared to push back it will be through “soft power” means – diplomatic isolation, and economic sanctions against individuals and businesses.
That is the longterm strategy for dealing with Putin as much as Ukraine – the long game is the hope that he will eventually succumb, despite his continuing popularity, to the internal contradictions building up in Russia. Falling oil prices and a declining rouble will do more than a few tanks in the Donbass. And, in truth, the real test of this agreement – the restraint of rebels – is in fact a test of Putin’s political authority. He has a personal political interest in showing that authority still means something.
And as for the EU and its fledgling diplomatic clout, we are reminded in no uncertain terms that political authority still rests when it comes to the crunch with the big beasts – Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Francois Hollande.