The UUP's low vote should not have surprised readers of my article here in April which examined the RTE post-referendum exit poll data on party voting intentions. That poll recorded only 19.4 per cent support for the main unionist party.
Only in two respects do Thursday's results differ from that exit poll's, which was swollen then by a turn-out of about 90 per cent, seems lower on this occasion. And, second, the DUP, as the major anti-agreement party, has pulled back from the UKUP votes that Bob McCartney's high profile during the referendum campaign had temporarily diverted to his small party.
And looking back to the forum election two years ago, the only significant change has been a shift from the UUP to Alliance and other cross-community parties.
Finally, the vote for anti-agreement candidates, including Independent Unionists and UUP anti-agreement candidates, corresponds closely to the proportion voting against the agreement a month ago.
At the time of writing, it is impossible to predict the precise outcome of an election which depends upon late transfers between many parties. But it seems unlikely these anti-agreement forces will between them mobilise the 30 members necessary to demand "key votes", or votes requiring a qualified majority of Assembly members.
In any event, even if they came close to 30 seats and several anti-agreement UUP Assembly-men joined the DUP and UKUP to provide the necessary 30 votes, this would not enable opponents of the agreement to disrupt Assembly work or block the implementation of its provisions.
Where a "key vote" is required, either by the terms of the agreement itself, (for example to elect jointly the First Minister and Deputy First Minister), or because 30 members have called for such a vote, the proposal in question can be approved by either of two "key voting" methods.
The first requires a bare majority of those present - which must include a majority both of those who have designated themselves as unionist and also of those who have designated themselves as nationalist. Under this method if Alliance decided not to declare itself unionist, 30 anti-agreement unionists could indeed constitute a majority of unionist members and under this method could block decisions.
But there is a second way in which a proposal can be approved: by 60 per cent of Assembly members, including only 40 per cent of unionists and 40 per cent of nationalists. And because the SDLP and Sinn Fein are likely between them to secure over 40 of the 108 seats, and Alliance, PUP, UDP and perhaps the Women's Coalition could secure between them about 10 seats, unionist strength could be well below 60.
In those circumstances the addition of the support of even 23-24 of a possible 5658 seats unionist votes would provide the 60 per cent overall majority requirement. And as that number of unionists would also constitute 40 per cent of the total unionist membership, this would meet the requirement for success in a "key vote". In fact the pro-agreement unionist Assembly men are likely to be more numerous than this.
So, to block a proposal under this alternative key voting arrangement it would be necessary for 34-35 - not 30 - of perhaps 56-58 unionist members to vote against a proposal. At no stage has it seemed likely that such a large number of anti-agreement unionist candidates would be elected. If that were to happen, the Alliance Party could declare itself unionist, thus raising to 39-40 the unionists required to block a decision.
It is frankly extraordinary, therefore, that so many journalists and commentators should have persisted in spreading the myth that a mere 30 anti-agreement unionist could block Assembly work. The danger to the successful working of the new political system lies elsewhere, above all in the persistent attempt to make decommissioning a pre-condition for Sinn Fein participation in the executive authority.
During the final stage of the negotiation, the unionist tactic of holding back its final negotiating position finally paid off. David Trimble secured the changes he needed in the Mitchell document. But this development shifted the centre of attention to Sinn Fein which inevitably sought and secured compensation in the form of two new concessions.
One of these related to a commitment in the draft agreement to complete a prison review process within an unspecified fixed timeframe. This concession to Sinn Fein involved adding to this draft provision a clause stating that the "intention would be that, should circumstances allow, two years after the commencement of the scheme, remaining qualified prisoners would be released".
The other concession involved dropping a phrase making decommissioning "an indispensable part of this agreement". Instead, a statement acceptable to Sinn Fein was introduced, that "all participants reaffirmed their commitment to total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations".
(While this particular provision was confined to paramilitary organisations, the need for general demilitarisation is, of course, recognised elsewhere in the agreement by a provision that "the British government will make progress towards the objective of as early as possible a return to normal security arrangements . . . consistent with the level of threat", including "reduction of the number and role of the Armed Forces to a level compatible with a normal peaceful society" and "removal of security installations [and] . . . of emergency powers".)
It was these last-minute concessions to Sinn Fein that led to Jeffrey Donaldson's walk-out, and to the Blair side-letter to David Trimble about the terms of the legislation dealing with these two issues. David Trimble felt it necessary to present this side-letter as modifying the terms of the agreement, whereas it could have no such effect.
What the agreement requires from Sinn Fein and the loyalist paramilitary parties on decommissioning is that, in addition to re-affirming their commitment to total disarmament of paramilitary organisations, they also confirm their intention to "continue to work constructively and in good faith with the independent Commission", and to use any influence they have to achieve the decommissioning of all arms within two years".
In addition the agreement also provides that those who become members of the executive authority must "commit themselves to non-violence and exclusively democratic and peaceful means".
In giving legislative form to these commitments, the British government has spelt out a requirement for a clear and unequivocal commitment that there is an end to violence on the part of republicans and loyalists.
But neither the agreement nor the legislation requires that decommissioning start before the executive authority is formed. To the extent that the UUP seeks to make this a precondition for its formation, it seeks to go beyond the agreement. But, perhaps recognising this reality, there have been indications in some recent UUP statements that it might feel able to accept, as an alternative to the commencement of decommissioning, a Sinn Fein or IRA declaration that "the war is over".
So far, Sinn Fein has been unwilling to make such a statement: Gerry Adams has been prepared to say no more than that he hopes the war is over. But there has been a statement by Mitchel McLaughlin that decommissioning will happen on a voluntary basis. And this position was then echoed by the IRA Commander in the Maze Prison.
Sinn Fein now faces a crucial choice. If its aim is simply to discomfit unionists, it can hold back until later a statement that "the war is over" and can also postpone voluntary decommissioning. That could lead to a long drawn-out and psychologically debilitating stand-off, with the UUP refusing to work with those whom Sinn Fein nominates to the post or posts in the shadow executive to which its numbers in the Assembly would entitle it.
But such a Sinn Fein posture would seriously undermine public confidence in the new structures at the crucial initial stage; it would damagingly postpone the process of determining the policy areas in which the new North-South structures would operate; and it would place great strain on the Sinn Fein/SDLP relationship, and on Sinn Fein's relationship with our Government, as well as with the British government.
That would be a high price to pay for the dubious pleasure of creating problems for its future UUP partners. It must be hoped Sinn Fein will not precipitate such a crisis.