Libya's decision to renounce its plans to build weapons of mass destruction has been widely and deservedly welcomed. But interpreting why it came about is becoming as controversial as the Anglo-American war against Iraq.
The British defence secretary, Mr Geoff Hoon, says "we showed after Saddam Hussein failed to co-operate with the United Nations that we meant business and Libya, and I hope other countries, will draw that lesson." The EU security representative, Mr Javier Solana, says the decision "clearly proves that diplomacy can win over the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons". For the Russian foreign minister, Mr Igor Ivanov, it "confirms once more the effectiveness of political and diplomatic efforts and dialogue in the search for ways of solving complicated international problems."
Timing, tactics and motives feed into the argument. United Nations sanctions against Libya, in place since the 1980s after its adventures with state terrorism (including large arms shipments to the IRA and the Lockerbie bombing), were much more effective than Ronald Reagan's punitive raid of 1986. Colonel Gadafy's decision to settle the Lockerbie affair at great cost led to their being lifted by the UN last year. Following secret talks with US and British representatives these countries are to follow suit. This will allow Libya to rejoin the international oil markets and attract investment and tourism. A clear motive for Colonel Gadafy has been to preserve his own regime from internal dissent and destabilisation.
Most of this has followed pathways of negotiation laid down before the Iraq war, involving calculations of advantage and disadvantage about the effects of sanctions rather than the threat of force. The implications for other states developing similar weapons, such as Iran, Syria, North Korea, Pakistan and Israel, are clear.
Iran's agreement to allow spot inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency followed direct pressure from France, Germany and Britain, in an apparent rebuke to US neo-conservative and Israeli threats of pre-emptive strikes. In the same way North Korea (by all accounts a more serious threat from such weapons than Iraq, where they have yet to be found) is beginning to respond to concerted pressure from the US, China and Japan. Syria is anxious to escape such branding, while Pakistan is indicating a new willingness to co-operate by questioning the father of its atomic weapons about co-operating with Iran. Israel pleads exceptionalism. There is more diplomatic carrot than military stick at work here. But the more or less articulated threat of both is usually needed to produce such results.