All conflicts have recurring characteristics and it may well be that Ireland's experience of conflict resolution can be used to good effect elsewhere, suggests John Coakley.
The announcement this week by Minister for Foreign Affairs Dermot Ahern of an annual €25 million for a conflict resolution unit within his department was another welcome sign that the Northern Ireland peace process has been bedding down.
Long-term observers of the Northern conflict who were stunned by the image of Ian Paisley and Gerry Adams conducting a joint press conference on March 26th and who could scarcely believe the warmth of the new First Minister's handshake with the Taoiseach in Farmleigh on April 4th have now become accustomed to the notion that a fundamental change has taken place in the North.
It would be rash to jump to the conclusion that everything is settled. Outstanding matters have the capacity to derail this finely-balanced deal: a summer of sensitive marches, security issues, sectarian conflict in interface areas, the potential for serious disagreements between the parties in government, and the ghosts of the paramilitary and security past, for instance.
But whatever ripples of dissent within parties or waves of disagreement between them may in future disturb the placid image of a community finally at peace with itself, it is certain that the persistence and courage of politicians, civil servants and other negotiators have paid off handsomely. The settlement has been widely hailed internationally as a remarkable but all too uncommon success story.
Are there parts of this story from which, as the Minister hopes, lessons may be drawn for conflicts elsewhere? The Irish peace process profited from experience in other parts of the world (in particular, South Africa) and it is clear that elsewhere, from the Basque country to Sri Lanka, others have been keeping an eye on developments here.
In addition to the more obvious features which ethnic-type conflicts have in common, three characteristics of the Northern Ireland peace process stand out: the distinctive institutional architecture radiating from Parliament Buildings in Stormont, the compelling incentive structure that propelled parties in conflict to pursue a solution, and the sustained involvement of patient, sensitive external actors.
First, as anyone who has read the Good Friday agreement and the modifications introduced in the St Andrews Agreement will be aware, political stability has been purchased by an extraordinarily complex yet workable institutional model.
At its core lie three geopolitical strands, the first two of which date back to 1972, when they were accepted by the British and Irish governments as the basis for any future settlement: devolved government for Northern Ireland based on the sharing of power between the two communities, and institutionalised links between North and South in recognition of the "Irish dimension" to the conflict.
The third strand, a redefinition of the relationship between Ireland and Great Britain, was pushed to the centre of the stage much later by John Hume and the SDLP, who were largely responsible for the overall blueprint in the first place. Arguably, this third strand, tackling a relationship which had long ceased to be seriously problematic, was less important than the unspoken "fourth strand" - the European dimension, which fundamentally repositioned all political relationships at lower levels.
Second, there were specific reasons why the recent settlement succeeded where Sunningdale collapsed in 1974. Paramilitary groups now had a vested interest in the parliamentary path. For republicans, this held out the prospect of access to at least some power in the short term, if not long-term victory - an option distinctly preferable to a continuing and costly military stalemate. For loyalists, it promised the neutralisation of the paramilitary enemy, and a better deal for the working-class areas they represented.
For paramilitaries on both sides, it meant the early release of prisoners and more secure lifestyles. For the other parties, it represented a new chance to capture power and replace direct rule ministers from London. Unionists saw it as a symbolic end to the hated Anglo-Irish agreement, even though it took one of the unionist parties, the DUP, much longer than the other to acknowledge the extent of their gains.
Third, it is obvious that the frequently invisible, self-effacing and unassuming work of teams of external facilitators was critical. In the early stages, the contribution of George Mitchell and his colleagues was central to brokering a deal, and to securing its implementation. Later the work of Gen John de Chastelain and the decommissioning body played a vital role.
Throughout, though, it was the negotiating skills and apparently limitless commitment of Taoiseach Bertie Ahern and British prime minister Tony Blair which were responsible for the ultimate achievement of a settlement (though the latter should not be described as an "external" actor, and one side to the conflict did not regard the Taoiseach as "external" either).
Neither should the much less visible role of their predecessors be ignored: Charles Haughey in agreeing to talks with the IRA, Albert Reynolds in bravely sticking to an unpopular line before the ceasefires, John Bruton in building on the ceasefires, and John Major in courageously risking his House of Commons majority in difficult circumstances which many of his critics chose to ignore.
There is nothing naively transferable in this formula. The uniqueness of all conflicts must be taken for granted. But there are recurring issues in all, especially those which are bicommunal and involve external actors, and the expertise built up over the years by Irish policy-makers offers an invaluable basis for assistance to other countries.
There are circumstances where, especially in the past, this experience would simply have been lost, as those involved moved on to confront new and very different problems. It is perhaps a sign of growing maturity and self-confidence that the Irish Government has decided that an international gesture of this kind is important; and it is a sign of wisdom on the part of the Minister and his department that they have chosen this particular arena in which to make it.
John Coakley is director at the Institute for British-Irish Studies in University College Dublin