Rather like Ireland in 1922, in 1999 Scotland entered a new, uncertain political and constitutional environment. Unlike Ireland, however, no part of Scotland became independent and Scotland did not gain the right to separation from London.

It did not even attain the status that Michael Collins famously referred to "not the ultimate freedom that all nations aspire and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it" although many in Scotland have looked to the tiger economy as a model and envy Ireland its seat at the top tables in the European Union.

Neither did Scotland acquire the same status as the 16 German Lander in a federal republic, where the rights of the Lander are constitutionally entrenched and defended by a Constitutional Court, even on European Union matters. Rather Scotland became a "sub-national authority" both within Britain and the EU. It is still trying to work out what this means.

It knows that both are important relationships. Some 61 per cent of Scottish exports go to EU countries, that being equivalent to £12 billion and about 70,000 jobs. In the period 1975-1997 Scotland received some £1,600 million in Regional and Structural Fund aid and £2,750 million in loans from the European Investment Bank.

Individual parts of Scotland have also benefited with Western Scotland receiving £260 million and Eastern Scotland £100 million (1994-1999) to help them cope with industrial decline and unemployment, while the Highlands and Islands received £240 million in the same period as an Objective I area.

Remarkably, in the shake-up of European Union funding in light of future enlargement at the Berlin European Council in march 1999 it was agreed that the Highlands and Islands would qualify as one of the areas to be treated as a "Particular Situations 2000-06", it being agreed that: "In view of the particular structural problems resulting from the low population density matched with a high degree of poverty, the Highlands and Islands of Scotland will receive a special phasing-out programme totalling €300 million (some £200 million).

The difficulty for Scotland is how to work out its relationship with the European Union, other sub-national authorities and indeed European states like Ireland. How the new Scottish Parliament and executive will relate to London on EU matters has taken considerable time to work out and the so-called "concordats" on that relationship were only published in October and still have to be ratified by the respective parties. The term "ratified" is slightly misleading since these concordats have no constitutional or legal standing, but are binding as it is put "in honour only", that is they are expected to become typically and peculiarly British conventions. They are rooted in the Scotland Act 1998 which makes quite clear that international relations in general and relations with the European Union are "reserved matters", that is, matters to be determined and decided upon by the United Kingdom government.

The concordats promise full consultation and co-ordination, but make it clear that there is to be a "single UK policy line". It is also made clear that "Decisions on Ministerial attendance at council meetings will be taken on a case-by-case basis by the lead UK minister". That UK minister is expected to take into account the likely impact of the matter under discussion on the devolved Scottish administration, but is free to decide. Some months after the creation of the new executive it appears that only once has a Scottish minister attended the council as part of the UK team, and it is still not clear in what circumstances a Scottish minister might lead the UK delegation.

This is all further complicated by the vexed question of confidentiality since the concordats are clear that participants in the formulation of the single UK line must respect the confidentiality of the negotiations between Edinburgh and London and then adhere to that line. Given that, on say, beef/BSE, the CAP in general and on the Common Fisheries Policy, there might well be profound disagreements between Edinburgh and London, especially if the political complexion of the Executive were different from that in London, it is difficult to see how this can survive.

The ad hoc "British-solution" to a "British-problem" is further compounded by the issue of Scottish representation in Brussels. Officially the UK permanent representation will continue to represent the interests of the whole of the United Kingdom, but in October the new Scotland Executive Office was established by the Scottish Executive in Brussels to promote Scottish interests.

Scotland has also to work out its relationships with other sub-national authorities, like Catalonia, and with states like Ireland. This latter has taken on a particular significance given the "Good Friday Agreement" and its provisions allowing two or more members of the "British-Irish Council" to develop bilateral or multilateral arrangements for consultation, co-operation and even joint decision-making on matters of mutual interest, of which the European Union is clearly one.

The Scottish First Minister Donald Dewar has recently paid a visit to Dublin and the Irish have opened a Consulate-General in Edinburgh. Even if the BIC does to come into formal existence, there clearly will be a pattern of relationships between the Republic and Scotland. If may well be that in addition to Scotland House in Brussels, there will be a range of Scottish Houses in other European locations.

There is a further contemporary twist to "Independence in Europe", namely that the Scottish National Party would wish to follow the Irish lead on immediate membership of economic and monetary union and the single currency. Some in the party, however, he begun to ask whether such membership is compatible with true independence, echoing an Eamon de Valera point made in 1955, namely that Ireland "did not strive to get over that domination of our affairs by outside force" so that a political federation in Europe or a European Parliament could decide the economic circumstances of Irish life.

There is much rhetoric in Scotland about Scots being more pro-European or less hostile to the EU than the English, but that still leaves the Scottish executive and parliament with the need to find an answer to the point made by Garret FitzGerald shortly after Irish entry, namely that since Ireland was to a remarkable degree a net beneficiary of Community policies, it needed to seek a way to compensate for that by playing a positive and constructive role.

Despite the British constraints, the real challenge for the new Scotland is find a distinctive positive and constructive role in the continuing European journey.