In two weeks' time Ireland's representatives will drop in for their annual White House bash/bonding ritual with the US President. It is much valued by Ireland's diplomats, a moment to share cultural and historical experience; almost a family gathering. But also an unusual, privileged access to the Administration for which many other states would give their eye teeth. Except, of course, Israel, for whom the welcome has traditionally been even more effusive, the politics even more closely in step.
Such privileged access, however, has unspoken ground rules. The White House hosts must not be taken for granted, their political support assumed, or be made to feel they are largely bit players in a domestic drama. And the visit must both avoid becoming embroiled in US partisan politics, and steer a delicate course between cap-in-hand deference and the arrogance of demandeur troublesome relatives.
It's not just a question of manners, but of understanding the nature of and constraints on such relationships, their asymmetry and realpolitik.
Benyamin Netanyahu got it wrong on virtually every count – tone deaf to the diplomacy and politics, or cynically indifferent to the future of US/Israel relations? The Israeli Prime Minister's speech to the joint houses of Congress on Tuesday, as a guest of its Republican leadership, was a partisan slap in the president's face, widely perceived as electioneering ahead of polling on St Patrick's Day, while demanding that President Obama toe his line unconditionally.
Importantly, on substance, he also got it wrong. What Netanyahu terms a “bad deal” on Iran’s nuclear programme, and one likely to trigger a regional arms race, in truth promises – though we have yet to see the full likely agreement – the only path to regional de-escalation.
What we know of a putative deal is that it will deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear weapons, putting in place, with rigorous international supervision and inspections, what experts accept would be a one-year technological barrier between what Iran can do now and the production of a bomb. There would be plenty of time for anxious neighbours and international powers to act to stop such a programme.
In exchange, Iran would be allowed to maintain a small-scale scientific nuclear research programme – an entitlement under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty – and see the gradual reduction in international sanctions, reversible if it is seen to breach the agreement.
The alternative to an agreement is far more likely to trigger an arms race. Unconstrained, Iran could proceed with its nuclear programme, moving towards a bomb capability. The result would certainly be to see regional neighbours, fearful of its potential, following suit in developing nuclear weapons, and to give currency to Israeli arguments for bombing Iran.
Israel’s fear of Iran is understandable although exaggerated by campaigning politicians – its intelligence services have much more sober and realistic assessments than their prime minister. The real problem is that Netanyahu appears no longer to trust Obama’s assurance on behalf of the US that “we’ve got Israel’s back”, another measure of how poorly he understands the dynamics of US politics.