The Government yesterday made a decision on aspects of the Defence White Paper. It was the third such decision on Defence Forces reorganisation in the past four years.

Far from indicating a new interest in our forces, these decisions have been pushed on two successive governments by those who would see the State stripped of a modicum of defence capability.

The genesis of the White Paper on which the Government decision was made is rooted in the problems encountered by the previous government in implementing the reorganisation implementation plan of March 1996. Arising from these difficulties, Fianna Fail promised a Defence White Paper. This later became part of the Programme for Government.

The White Paper was not preceded by a discussion document (or Green Paper) but submissions from interested parties were solicited. Detailed and constructive inputs were received from the representative associations, RACO and PDFORRA, and from the military authorities.

In the event, the draft was prepared by civil servants at the Department of Defence without consultation with the general staff. This led to the unseemly public row of the past few weeks.

Arising from the disharmony, the Chief-of-Staff submitted a possible compromise and way forward to the Minister. The compromise was discussed between the Chief-of-Staff and the Minister. This agreement was then to be incorporated into the "decision sought" portion of the Memorandum for Government. The actual White Paper is to be amended, but in the meantime we have yesterday's decision and the ensuing press conference as a starting point.

What then are the essential elements of the decision and what do they mean? They are worth examining under the following heading:

Defence Forces numbers;

Chief-of-Staff's powers to recruit and to control promotions;

Structure;

Re-equipment;

Council of Defence;

Modus operandi within the Department of Defence;

10-year moratorium.

The initial proposals were for a reduction of 1,000 personnel to a strength ceiling of 10,500. This was for all three services: Army, Air Corps and Naval Service. As the Minister had gone public on these totals, and would have lost face if any change of direction was necessary, the military proposed that the ceiling remained at 10,500 but that these would be trained personnel and would not include personnel in training, who number approximately 500 at any one time.

This has been agreed, but numbers in training have been reduced to 250. This may seem satisfactory, but the net result is a loss of 750 jobs at a time when demands for our forces are increasing in Europe and the internal security situation vis-a-vis Northern Ireland is unchanged. The White Paper was hopelessly optimistic on the latter and scarcely mentioned European commitments. Hopefully, the rewrite will address this.

Powers to recruit and control promotions are an essential codicil to the numbers agreed. Without it the ceiling of 10,500 is meaningless.

To illustrate, the 1996 agreement was to reduce numbers to 11,500. The current Minister informed me that he had Cabinet approval to recruit automatically up to that ceiling. This did not happen. Control of recruiting was left in the hands of civil servants at the Departments of Defence and Finance, and numbers have been allowed to fall to 10,900.

As for controlling promotions, this allows the Chief-of-Staff to deal with the choke points which have arisen in NCO promotions and which were not being dealt with, resulting in very slow promotion prospects for NCOs and privates.

The decision on retaining the "Three Brigade" structure is to be welcomed. It will be difficult to maintain with 1,000 fewer personnel. It is proposed to fill the gaps by integrating some FCA personnel into the full-time professional units where possible.

This will mean an increase in training to bring the reservists up to standard. It is a further boost that the Chief-of-Staff will control the extra financial resources to implement this training.

The decision on additional resources for much-needed equipment for the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service is welcome. If all the resources which the Minister promised at the press conference are put into equipment programmes, they should satisfy the requirements of all three services. Such promises have been made before, so vigilance is necessary.

One worry must be that the savings from personnel cuts will not come on stream until 2002. This is too late.

One must also comment on the principle of funding major equipment programmes by personnel cuts and from inside the normal annual defence budget. Thirty years of neglect cannot be funded from running costs.

The Minister has informed us that he does not now intend introducing legislation to do away with the Council of Defence. He says that he will instead chair the strategic management committee in the Department of Defence, replacing the secretary-general of the Department, who currently chairs it.

He says that if he gets it running satisfactorily he will review the situation later. From bitter experience I can tell him that he will have his work cut out. This "high-powered management organ" has met only twice in the 18 months since I retired and has a very poor record in strategic decision-making. In the meantime, the device of the Council of Defence will continue to be an essential, if rarely used, appeal mechanism for the military. This is to be welcomed.

THE compromise list submitted by the military also included a plea to have an integrated civil/military department as suggested by the 1991 review of the Department of Defence. There was no mention of this yesterday.

In all democracies one expects a department of finance to be tough and tight-fisted. In such democracies, however, one will find defence ministers, civil servants and the military fighting from the same corner in pursuance of their slice of the national cake. This State is virtually unique in having a defence civil service frequently in conflict with the military.

The 10-year moratorium is also to be welcomed. In the past 10 years, the Defence Forces have been subjected to almost continuous assessment. In 1990, there was the Gleeson Commission, in 1991 EAG1, in 1992 EAG2, in 1994 EAG3 (or PriceWaterhouse), in 1996 the Defence Forces Reorganisation Plan, in 1997-98 the PriceWaterhouse review of the Air Corps and Naval Service, and now in 2000 the Defence White Paper.

Enough is enough. The Defence Forces now require time to reorganise and train. They do not require armies of consultants and civil servants attacking them constantly from the rear. They are required to keep their eye on the ball and not be looking over their shoulders for the enemy within.

The Defence White Paper has been an unnecessary and brutal experience for all involved. No one has come out of the encounter a winner. The Minister has been forced to back down on some points. The civil servants at the Department of Defence must now know that they approached the exercise in a wrong way.

The Chief-of-Staff has been forced to display his disagreement with his Minister, something no serving officer should have to do. Above all, there is now rampant distrust between all sides.

This damage can only be rectified by the publication of the signed agreement between the Minister and the Chief-of-Staff. Its publication will convince all that a new phase is about to begin. The fact that the agreement was swept under the carpet yesterday and remains unpublished can only add further fuel to the fire.

Lieut Gen McMahon is a retired chief-of-staff of the Defence Forces