The latest disclosures on the Arms Crisis of 1970 are valuable additions to our store of information on the most startling political event in Irish politics in the second half of the last century, but they also add to the danger of complicating an already confused situation.

Further information is likely to be disclosed on a regular basis under the 30-year rule and the Freedom of Information legislation, so it will be necessary from time to time for students of history and politics to analyse and interpret the material.

The most recent discussion among commentators has concentrated on what Jack Lynch knew and when he knew it. The disclosure of the Lynch memos in The Irish Times last week represented a repeat, almost word for word, of a statement he made in the Dail at the time of the publication in Magill of the Berry Diaries in May 1980.

For those who were convinced that Lynch knew from the start of the involvement of members of his government in the plot to import arms, the memos did nothing to lessen their conviction.

For people like me, however, who were always convinced of Lynch's honesty and of his complete surprise on learning from Peter Berry, the secretary of the Department of Justice, in April 1970, of the involvement of ministers in the conspiracy, it led to a renewed study of the evidence. The conviction of Lynch's critics arises mainly from Peter Berry's claim that he gave Lynch information in October 1969 which should have alerted him.

The only evidence we have of information conveyed by Berry to Lynch in most bizarre circumstances as a patient about to undergo a major operation in Mount Carmel Hospital on October 17th, 1969 was that an Army officer had attended a meeting in Bailieboro, Co Cavan, attended by heads of Defence Committees from Northern Ireland and had promised them £50,000 to buy guns for their defence.

There is no evidence that members of the government were mentioned by Berry, nor could they have been mentioned because it was two months later before the gardai told the minister for justice, Micheal O Morain, of their suspicions that Charlie Haughey was involved.

A report from the Committee of Public Accounts, just published, revealed that Garda Commissioner Michael Wymes and the head of the Special Branch, Chief Supt John Fleming, told the minister for justice, O Morain, in mid-December, 1969, of a meeting between Haughey and a senior IRA man. O Morain told the gardai to keep checking.

In the case of the information conveyed by Berry to Lynch on the Bailieboro meeting, we know that Lynch contacted the minister for defence, Jim Gibbons, who contacted the Army head of intelligence, Col Michael Hefferon, to make enquiries. There is no evidence that Gibbons ever responded to Lynch's request for information, nor is there any evidence so far of Hefferon responding to Gibbons's request.

It has been argued that Lynch should have pursued the matter, but it is understandable that a Taoiseach in the midst of all the other claims on his time would not have been greatly disturbed about an account of a meeting, even with alleged subversives, involving a relatively junior Army officer. As he remarked afterwards, "if it is a matter requiring Garda investigation, let the gardai do their job".

THE OTHER argument now being advanced is that because Lynch knew about the directive given by Gibbons to the chief of staff, Gen Sean McKeown, on February 6th, 1970 to prepare the Army for incursions into Northern Ireland to hand out weapons to members of the nationalist population in a doomsday situation, he therefore knew of the plan to import arms from the continent.

The argument is that the directive led to the importation of arms, but there is nothing in the directive to support this argument. The question may be asked as to where the weapons were to come from to be handed out to Northern nationalists if the situation warranted it. The answer would appear to be that the government envisaged that the 500 older guns set aside by the Army on Government orders in August 1969 for such a situation should be sufficient.

The counter-argument is that these guns could be easily identified as former Army weapons and only non-identifiable guns should be used, but there is nothing in the wording of the directive to suggest the government had this in mind.

Of course, had the government at the time or since admitted to its having reached a decision to intervene in a doomsday situation, much confusion could have been avoided. It was only the recent release of the Army papers of the period that confirmed the issuing of the Army directive of February 6th, 1970.

Capt Jim Kelly's evidence at the Arms Trial about the February 6th directive did not receive the attention it deserved. The directive, or a copy, could not be found and efforts were made by the prosecution to cast doubts on whether such a directive ever existed. But, again, as in the case of Capt Kelly's evidence relating to Jim Gibbons's knowledge of events, the reliable and very impressive Michael Hefferon was on hand to corroborate.

Jack Lynch was quite definite that the first he knew of the involvement of members of the Government in the arms plot was when Peter Berry came to him with the evidence on April 20th, 1970. Peter Berry claims he told him a week earlier on April 13th and that the Taoiseach appeared to be taken by surprise. Berry had been under the impression that his minister, Micheal O Morain, had been informing the Taoiseach all along of the various pieces of information coming into the Department of Justice from the Garda Special Branch.

Jack Lynch told me long after the Arms Trial that he asked O Morain before demanding his resignation from the government why he had not told him. O Morain's reply was that he did not tell him because he did not believe the Garda information. He could not believe, he told Lynch, that members of the government were involved in such a plot. Above all, he could not believe the information about Haughey.

Lynch added that he was so shocked at the information that he had lost all trust in his colleagues in government. I suggested that there were several members of the government whom he knew were completely trustworthy and that it would make life impossible if he were to continue to distrust everybody.

He replied: "How can I ever trust anybody again after what has happened?"

Michael Mills, a former Ombudsman, was political correspondent of the Irish Press at the time of the Arms Crisis