IRAQ:Shifts are taking place on Iraq's political stage as Iran broadens its client base, writes Michael Jansen
Key players on the Iraqi stage are preparing for the withdrawal of US troops during 2008 and 2009. Iraq's defence minister Abdel Qader al-Obeidi has revealed that the Iraqi army is making contingency plans for dealing with a security vacuum if and when US forces depart and boosting its defence spending by 26 per cent to buy equipment from the US and Russia.
In order to project itself as an Iraqi organisation, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a faction founded and fostered by Tehran, changed its name to the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) and shifted from the guidance of Iran's spiritual mentor Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to Iraq's most senior cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. SIIC's head, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, effected these changes before going to Tehran for cancer treatment rather than Houston, where his disease was diagnosed. His choice distances him from the US as he bets that Iraqi Shias are less anti-Iranian than anti-American.
SIIC's most serious rival, the movement led by radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, pulled its ministers out of the weak and unpopular Maliki government and is cultivating an image of nationalism and moderation.
Al-Sadr, who commands the largest Iraqi armed force, has clamped down on loyal militiamen responsible for killing Sunnis and dismissed rogue ele- ments targeting Sunnis. Al-Sadr has also appealed to Sunni religious figures, tribal chiefs and insurgent groups to co-operate with the Sadrists against the US occupation and the presence in Iraq of al-Qaeda fighters. He seeks to enlist the support of Sunni leaders in the Gulf and Jordan in this effort.
The Sunni groups he is courting are battling al-Qaeda and foreign militants in Anbar, Dyala and Nineva provinces.
Sunni leaders and resistance groups reject the excesses of foreign extremist factions and are reshaping their images and redrafting their agendas to be able to compete for popular support in the coming power struggle. The Sadrists and these Sunni groups share the same agenda. They demand US withdrawal, the imposition of Islamic canon law (Sharia), and a strong central government. But until al-Sadr compels all his followers to halt attacks on Sunnis, the Sadrists will not be seen as a potential partner.
Tehran is positioning itself for a US pull-out by broadening its Iraqi client base. Initially Iran focused on traditional allies, SCIRI/SIIC and Dawa, whose leaders and members took refuge in Iran during the Baathist era. But Iran has more recently forged ties with other Shia groups, including the Sadrists who accept aid but remain wary of Tehran.
The Kurds are strengthening their presence in the oil-rich Kirkuk province and other lands adjacent to the Kurdish region with the aim of annexing these territories. By contributing
troops to the US-led pacifi- cation of Baghdad, the Kurds are also trying to maintain good relations with Washington.
The decision of ailing Jalal Talabani, chief of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and president of Iraq, to go to a facility in Minnesota to lose weight was meant as a message that the Kurds continue to see the US as their chief ally. This contrasts with the choice of the SIIC leader, a temporary collaborator, to go to Tehran for medical treatment. Finally, the Bush administration is, apparently, contemplating replacing the Maliki government with one headed by ex-premier Ali Allawi, a secular Shia who would try to rein in Shia fundamentalists and reach out to the Sunni-secular opposition.