The cosy Southern consensus on the need to encourage, rather than pressurise, the Provisional republican movement into arms decommissioning was shattered in the Dail last week. John Bruton broke ranks by suggesting Sinn Fein should not be allowed into the Northern executive without prior decommissioning.
It was a dangerous tactic. It allied Fine Gael with the demands of the unionist parties in Northern Ireland. And while it may have accorded with the spirit of the Belfast Agreement, it did not reflect the letter of that document.
Recognition of that fact came belatedly when, following separate conversations with Bill Clinton and Gerry Adams, Mr Bruton amended his position and spoke of the need for "parallel progress" through the simultaneous implementation of all aspects of the Belfast Agreement.
A party spokesman argued the change had been "one of emphasis rather than position". But in circumstances where the Fine Gael front bench had also disagreed on the need for, and acceptability of, the Government's emergency anti-terrorist legislation, it was a case of engaging in damage limitation.
The seeds of speculation about internal Fine Gael difficulties germinated when the Dail was recalled last week and Mr Bruton embarked on an analysis of recent IRA statements, warning that Government policy should not be based on wishful thinking, fudge or illusion.
In a chilling exposition of the IRA's stated positions on decommissioning and the Belfast Agreement, Mr Bruton urged politicians not to be swayed by the honeyed words of Sinn Fein, which was the subservient body within the republican movement. Decommissioning should begin before Sinn Fein received ministerial responsibility in Northern Ireland.
Within hours of the speech, John Browne of Carlow/Kilkenny was asking the Fine Gael parliamentary party whether it had been "politically prudent" for Mr Bruton to take that line. But his was the only voice to publicly express disquiet. Other members of the party agreed with their leader's analysis, while privately disagreeing with his conclusion.
The Government was so annoyed by Mr Bruton's interference with what Bill Clinton's aides described as "the careful choreography of the peace process" that it sent Jim McDaid into the Dail to criticise the use of "ill-chosen words and ill-timed statements". They could, he said, "cloud and darken the climate of goodwill that is so essential if we are to have a new beginning".
The Minister for Tourism, Sport and Recreation went further. He was opposed to "provocative questioning on issues like decommissioning" and said the answer to that question was "ask me that in two years' time".
In his anxiety to rubbish Mr Bruton's concerns, Dr McDaid also spoke of "the clear and unambiguous Sinn Fein statement that the war is over". And later, Government sources suggested the influence of Eoghan Harris may have had a bearing on the Fine Gael leader's position.
There was a deal of overkill in it all. For whatever about Gerry Adams's hope that violence was "now a thing of the past, over, done with and gone", it did not - as the Minister maintained - represent an undertaking that the war was over. Had it done so, it would have fulfilled the repeated requests made during the summer by Mr Bruton, who had sought such an undertaking from the IRA.
Difficulties on the emergency legislation front opened up an old fault line within Fine Gael. Alan Dukes and Alan Shatter argued at a front bench meeting that elements of the proposed Bill were unnecessary, almost certainly unconstitutional, and should be opposed. But John Bruton took the view there was a convention about security legislation within the party which guaranteed support for such measures where a government said it was required on security advice.
Echoes of the famous "mongrel foxes" episode under Liam Cosgrave's leadership dissipated, however, when Mr Bruton told those present they were free to make their concerns about the legislation public in the Dail. The party as a whole would support the legislation while criticising and seeking to amend elements of it.
Mr Bruton himself made no direct reference to the legislation in his Dail speech. For his part, Mr Dukes took on the mantle of liberal Fine Gael when he rejected the Bill as running contrary to the rule of law and as "bad legislation".
As rumours of a Fine Gael split circulated at the weekend, Mr Dukes countered by supporting Mr Bruton in his analysis of the Sinn Fein/IRA position and said hard questions had to be asked by Opposition leaders. As for the emergency legislation, nobody had been very happy with it, he said, but Mr Bruton's view about the convention on security legislation had prevailed.
The Fine Gael leader had concentrated his fire in the Dail on the need for the IRA to disarm and to accept the new situation arising from the ratification of the Belfast Agreement on an all-Ireland basis.
There was, he said, a serious contradiction between the positions adopted by Sinn Fein and the IRA. The IRA held the Belfast Agreement was not a "solid base for a lasting settlement" and refused to decommission arms. Because of that, Gerry Adams's statement should be read for what it actually said and not in any wish-fulfilling way. By the same yardstick, Martin McGuinness's appointment to the Disarmament Commission had not changed the fundamental IRA policy on arms retention.
As for those who held Sinn Fein and the IRA to be separate organisations, that was nonsense. Mr Bruton held: "At the top level, the direction of the two organisations is identical in philosophy, purpose and execution. They are one and the same. Two organisations in one movement, with one purpose, one strategy and one direction."
His comments fell like icy particles into a warm and comfortable Dail consensus that had been encouraged by the pending visit by President Clinton. Bertie Ahern's hopes and aspirations and his trust in Sinn Fein's commitment to the Belfast Agreement began to look fragile. Worse than that, succour was being offered by the main Opposition party to those unionist groups determined to smash the Belfast Agreement.
The Labour Party and Democratic Left had, in turn, exhorted Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA to abide by democratic means and to reject physical force. But they stopped short of setting preconditions for Sinn Fein's involvement in a new Northern executive. They were still prepared to give Gerry Adams and Sinn Fein the benefit of the doubt and to abide strictly by the terms of the Belfast Agreement.
By stepping beyond that line, Mr Bruton broke the nationalist consensus and brought trouble - not for the first time - on his party . But that is the kind of man he is - detail tends to get in the way of the larger picture. The momentum behind politics in this country is frequently driven by emotion. A logical and analytical approach can be as unpopular as it is unprofitable. Alan Dukes discovered that to his cost when the mould-breaking Tallaght Strategy helped to write "finis" to his leadership of Fine Gael!
So, when John Bruton's supporters talk about the effect Mr Clinton's comments had on him as "bringing about a change of emphasis, rather than position", you recognise it as simple damage limitation.
In trying to provide Fine Gael with a distinctive Northern Ireland profile last week, Mr Bruton took a step too far. Given the thought and effort that had gone into his analysis of the situation, it was a pity the political conclusion fell outside the strict terms of the agreement.