Internal problems within wartime coalitions have been endemic, but not necessarily fatal. Marshal Foch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in 1918, said his alliance experiences had reduced his respect for Napoleon, whose wars were against alliances.
Arab defections from the loose grouping organised by America may occur. Even Britain has doubts about attacking Iraq without evidence of involvement in the September 11th or anthrax incidents. But adherence by all members all the time is not essential.
The joke about America providing the Northern Alliance's air force may well become reality. There are good reasons for American air support for Northern Alliance ground offensives, provided the political conditions are right.
Target indication and avoidance of friendly-fire casualties are probably being done by Special Operations Forces already. Larger ground involvement may be close.
Appearance of the AC-130 gunships indicates confidence that air defences are no longer a danger - at least in some areas. The Stinger man-portable anti-aircraft weapon in Afghan hands has a range of about 3.1 miles, with maximum height of three miles. A height of 2,000 ft (below half a mile) has been quoted for one AC-130 attack technique. The plane is heavily armoured, but slow. Obviously, the ground air defences would need prior and ongoing suppression.
Both types of AC-130 have 105mm cannon. That means they fire four-inch shells, devastating against the poor mud-brick and rubble buildings seen on TV. This measurement, 105mm, is the calibre of our field artillery guns; several armies use this calibre for light artillery. But field guns need wheels and strong recoil mechanisms. An aircraft-mounted 105mm cannon has a shorter range than a field gun, and a weaker propellent reduces firing shock.
The Taliban "command and control" installations have been much targeted. Operational, intelligence and logistics signal the traffic flow down and up the system. Command, control, intelligence - and the communications for them - are vital in modern armies, and are sometimes called "C three I".
This concept and its communications have become sophisticated over the years. Communications are important targets. Antennae (aerials) are often "remoted" from their radio vehicles because locating equipments home in on antennae. There is always "built-in redundancy" - spare links and standby equipment, etc. Dummy "decoys" are also installed.
Conventional armies will only reluctantly admit that not all these communications are essential. Since the Taliban emerged, their communications have always been skeletal but adequate for their purposes. Traffic grows to fill the links available. This is not to deny the amount and variety of communications needed for a modern force. Logistics and data traffic alone will be heavy.
But the Taliban did not launch many large-scale co-ordinated attacks. They are said to have made much use of couriers. Accounts from Afghanistan say the Taliban tend to fight in feudal fashion - for their own tribal leaders. Relations between leaders fluctuate. The exiguous Taliban command and control links are now claimed to be largely destroyed.