The IRA has come a long way since regarding the laying down of weapons as surrender, writes Dan Keenan, Northern Editor.
Decommissioning has been the peace process millstone since the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998.
In the face of unionist and British demands, the IRA initially insisted unequivocally: "Let us make it clear that there will be no decommissioning by the IRA." For more than 12 months after the Belfast Agreement, there was no agreement on the formation of a Northern Ireland Executive because unionists insisted on prior decommissioning.
The Trimble policy of "no guns, no government" was the irresistible force which met the immovable object of the IRA's stance which equated the decommissioning of one bullet or one ounce of explosive with abject surrender.
In July 1998, P O'Neill - the usual signatory of IRA statements - issued a statement decrying the unionist position but, significantly, did not rule out decommissioning.
By November that year, the IRA authorised another statement. This time, the organisation appeared to equate moves on decommissioning with "buying" political progress.
Following the much-delayed establishment of the institutions of the Belfast Agreement, P O'Neill stated: "The IRA will appoint a representative to enter into discussions with Gen John de Chastelain and the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning ."
However by early 2000, First Minister David Trimble was on the verge of following through on his threat to quit in the absence of an IRA move on arms.Northern Secretary Peter Mandelson suspended Stormont to prevent its collapse, amid strong republican protests. Four days later, the IRA withdrew its contact with the IICD.
Despite the gloom following the Stormont suspension in February 2000, another twist emerged by May. Political talks envisaged a sequence of events linking political progress to decommissioning and seemed to link IRA moves on weapons to British demilitarisation.
"The contents of a number of our arms dumps will be inspected by agreed third parties, who will report that they have done so to the IICD. The dumps will be re-inspected regularly to ensure that the weapons have remained silent," the IRA promised.
It worked: power-sharing was restored at Stormont. However, the IRA accused the British government of not upholding its side of the bargain and unionists accused the IRA of the same and of keeping its contacts with the IICD to a minimum.
In the aftermath of the 2001 British general election, which saw Sinn Féin gains at the expense of the SDLP, the IRA claimed in August it had agreed a decommissioning scheme with the IICD. Unionists reiterated demands for actual decommissioning to begin.
Further suspensions of Stormont stiffened unionist demands for the IRA's guns to be "put beyond use" and enraged nationalists, who felt the British government was pandering to David Trimble.
Yet despite the poisonous political mix, made worse by the furore over the arrest of three Irishmen in Colombia, the IRA nonetheless began actual decommissioning in October 2001. This was done, according to P O'Neill, to "save the peace process" and "to persuade others of our genuine intentions". By April 2002, a second act of decommissioning was carried out. The IRA insisted the deed was unilateral and stressed the need for the British government to play its part.
However, the crisis which erupted over allegations of an IRA spy ring at Stormont in October 2002 led to another withdrawal of the IRA representative from the IICD and another, still open-ended, suspension of Stormont.
Efforts throughout 2003 underscored the links between political progress and IRA decommissioning and British demilitarisation or "normalisation". Following weeks of sustained contacts between Sinn Féin and David Trimble, both governments thought they had an arrangement which would deliver both conclusive moves on weapons and sustainable renewal of the Stormont institutions.
Amid great ceremony at Hillsborough Castle however, unionists said the third act of IRA decommissioning was too secretive to foster unionist confidence. The deal collapsed amid recrimination.
Political efforts continued throughout 2004 with the parties and the two governments meeting at Leeds Castle in Kent in September for an intensive effort to find agreement. Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern delivered their "blueprint" to the parties in November. Sinn Féin accepted the governments' plans as Ian Paisley insisted that the time was "now or never" for a deal involving decommissioning.
However, by the time Mr Blair and Mr Ahern arrived in Belfast in December in the hope of announcing a breakthrough, the political atmosphere was already sour.
The DUP held to a demand for photographic evidence of decommissioning and that the IRA show remorse for its campaign. Gerry Adams criticised Dr Paisley's "unacceptable language" and the hoped-for deal came up short.