NI conflict 'unlikely to be eradicated in short term'

"For historical reasons conflict is built into society in Northern Ireland

"For historical reasons conflict is built into society in Northern Ireland. The roots of this conflict are many and varied and therefore, not likely to be readily eradicated in the short term." This was the conclusion of a high-level Stormont think-tank on the Northern security situation in March 1976.

The paper, by the working party on law and order of the Stormont secretariat, traced the violence to a number of causes: "They include the traditional friction between the Gael and the Scots/Irish planter stock; the cultural divide between the Catholics and the Protestants; the economic disparity (though now diminishing) in the wealth commanded by the two communities; anti-British feeling in some sections of the Irish community; Protestant fears of a 'takeover' of the province by the Republic."

Arising from these historical roots, violence had become endemic in Northern Ireland, the report said. "History may have so structured society that conflict is inevitable. But individuals do not see themselves as taking to the bomb and the bullet in order to act out a historical imperative." Rather, motivation stemmed from three sources:

l "The traditional republican desire to expel the British from Ireland and create a United Ireland." This was matched "by the determination of the loyalist majority in Northern Ireland not to be subjugated in this way".

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l "Civil disaffection arising from community conflict: this is the other side of the coin. Even if the dispute about sovereignty over Northern Ireland did not exist it is clear that those who believe, rightly or wrongly, that they are socially and economically disadvantaged would resort to protest action and possibly violence."

l "The corruption of the past six years of violence", which had resulted in the inculcation of violence in young people.

The working party identified five major threats to law and order. The first was from the Provisional IRA. They concluded that "whatever political accommodation may be reached in the North, there will, for several years to come, be a residual Provisional campaign. If the present Provisional movement collapses completely, it will have heirs."

The Irish government's attitude would be very important in countering such lingering violence.

Secondly, the paper identified the danger of "acts of violence arising from the grievances, real or imaginary, in the Catholic community". These included "a sense of non-participation in government in the broadest sense", economic factors, provocation by militant loyalists and resentment at "a too overt British presence".

The memo noted: "Though relatively few people may be prepared to commit acts of violence against the abstract concept of British sovereignty, it is likely that a greater number would react violently to the presence of troops on the streets in which they live."

The third threat stemmed from the loyalist paramilitaries, which "are here to stay at least as long as the threat of republican violence continues". The think-tank said much of the loyalist violence was reactive, but "they react not only to republican violence but also to any economic or political or social advance by the minority community which they interpret as an advance at the expense of the majority community".

This situation was likely to be exacerbated by the continuing decline in the North's economic prospects, which in the near future was "likely to bite hard into the standard of living of the Protestant working class".

The document identified two further threats to security. The first was the climate of violence abroad. Modern weapons and new terrorist techniques were available, while the ongoing emergency had "exacerbated the corruption of morals and the breakdown of the traditional family and church authority".

A final source stemmed from the possibility of "non-sectarian revolutionary violence" taking root, possibly evolving from "the Official IRA aided by existing Marxist revolutionary groups".

In an accompanying assessment of forms of violence, the working party pinpointed sectarian violence and intimidation.

"Sectarian attacks will continue for the foreseeable future. On occasion this will take the form of massacre such as the murder of 10 workmen at Whitecross on January 5th, 1976 which will dangerously raise the temperature in the community."