European Diary: With so much uncertainty surrounding the ratification process for the proposed European Union constitution, it is worth considering what will happen if one or more member-states reject the constitution.
Politicians and EU officials dislike such speculation, stating flatly that "there is no Plan B".
In fact, as Charles Grant demonstrates in his fascinating new pamphlet, What happens if Britain votes No? from the Centre for European Reform (www.cer.org. uk), there are any number of emergency plans under discussion throughout Europe.
Although Grant focuses on the consequences of a British rejection of the treaty, many of his observations apply equally well to the failure of other countries to ratify it. He argues that if most countries approve the constitution, there is little chance that they will sit back and accept a veto on it from one member-state.
Grant identifies 10 possible scenarios in the event of a British rejection of the treaty, some of which could lead to a radical change in the nature of the EU and most of which would have important implications for Ireland.
When Ireland and Denmark voted against EU treaties in the past, they agreed to hold a second referendum after receiving assurances from other member-states on delicate policy issues. Grant argues, however, that the constitution offers little scope for such assurances or for opt-outs from its provisions.
"The problem about the constitutional treaty, in contrast to earlier EU treaties, is that it does very little to extend the EU's remit into new areas of policy, so it is hard to see what the British could opt out of.
"Most of the treaty is about institutions and decision-making procedures. One country could not opt out of say, double majority voting or the creation of the EU foreign minister - such rules and institutions either apply to everyone or they cannot work," he says.
Grant rejects as unlikely the notion that a country such as Britain would be pushed out of the EU if it rejected the constitution. He believes that countries such as France and Germany are more likely to respond to a British No vote with their own plans for closer co-operation.
"In Berlin there are people close to Schröder who say they already have a plan under wraps - to be unveiled the day after the British vote No.
"Apparently France and Germany would announce their intention to build a closer union that would cover eight or nine policy areas," Grant says. "They would immediately involve Belgium and Luxembourg and then invite other member-states to join them . . . A new secretariat would organise the co-operation."
Such co-operation would amount to the formation of the "core Europe" that has long been favoured by some senior French and German politicians.
Grant believes that such a step could prove too difficult, politically and legally, in the short term and that integrationist member-states could be obliged to use a variety of mechanisms - inside and outside the EU treaties - to co-operate more closely.
"After a number of years, the leaders of the countries that were in all these smaller groups would probably hold informal meetings among themselves.
"One day these leaders would hold a dinner and then emerge to announce that they considered themselves the EU's de facto leadership group. Being involved in the complete range of its policies and actions, they would take it upon themselves to provide guidance and direction to the whole EU," Grant continues.
"They would establish a small secretariat to co-ordinate their positions. And they would normally vote as a block in the Council of Ministers. This, then, would be a 'messy core' at the heart of the EU."
Countries outside this "messy core" could find their influence sharply diminished, a particularly dangerous situation for a small country such as Ireland.
There is much to criticise in the EU constitution, although traditional federalists may have as much to complain about in it as opponents of further EU integration.
But those who vote against the constitution should not do so in the belief that they are protecting the status quo. They are more likely to trigger a period of intense change, during which the EU's bigger countries will hold most of the trump cards.
