ANALYSIS: The Istanbul meeting will have achieved a lot if it can defuse international tensions by showing negotiation is the alternative to military action
THIS IS the first time since January 2011 that Iran has agreed to sit down with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, the so-called P5+1.
Last year’s talks in Istanbul, like those held in Geneva in 2010, failed to make any progress.
The stakes are even higher now.
The current meeting comes after six months of unprecedented tension between Iran and the international community on the nuclear issue.
President Barack Obama, who in the early months of his presidency looked to engage the Iranian leadership in positive diplomacy, is now warning that the window of opportunity for a diplomatic solution to the crisis is closing quickly.
Concern is especially high over the possibility that Israel intends to launch a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities in the short term. Estimates of the consequences of such a strike vary. At the very least it will further destabilise an already unstable region and play havoc with the world’s oil supplies.
It also seems likely that, in response to any attack, specially trained Iranian military units and Iran’s non-state proxies such as Hizbullah in Lebanon will undertake revenge attacks against Israel, Europe, the US and the pro-western Gulf sheikdoms. Worst-case scenarios even talk of all-out regional war.
On top of this, the one issue on which the frontrunners in the Republican presidential primaries seem to agree is that the US has both a right and a duty to use military force to prevent Iran gaining a nuclear capability.
This has led to speculation that if a Republican nominee beats Obama in next November’s US presidential election he may give the green light to a US military strike on Iran soon after taking office.
But if the stakes are high, the expectations for the meeting are low.
It took a week of wrangling and public spats before the parties could even agree to Istanbul as a venue. More worrying is the fact that the relationship between Iran and four of the six world powers attending has deteriorated significantly since the last get-together in Istanbul 15 months ago.
Reeling from Iran’s rejection of his early efforts at outreach and with one eye on the upcoming election, Obama has become increasingly outspoken about his determination to stop Iran from going nuclear.
Since 2008, EU leaders have been even more outspoken than Obama on their commitment to ending the Iranian nuclear programme. But, in January 2012, the EU exceeded all expectations by introducing a set of unprecedented and wide-ranging sanctions that have left its relationship with Iranian leaders at an all-time low.
That leaves China and Russia.
Both have built up extensive economic, military and diplomatic ties with Tehran. They have also co-operated in blocking attempts by the US and EU to use the UN Security Council to pressure Iran. But in recent years China has felt increasingly compelled to take a tougher line for two reasons.
First, unlike Moscow, Beijing accepts Washington’s strategic and military lead in the region, at least in the medium term.
Second, the Chinese leadership has become increasingly disillusioned with Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. They view him as a liability to China’s extensive economic investment in the country, as well as to the stability of a vital region.
In these terms, despite real philosophical and practical concerns over a US-led sanctions regime, there is no support in Beijing for Iranian intransigence on the nuclear issue. It is precisely those times (2006 and 2010) when Iranian actions have been viewed as destabilising the region that China has supported the imposition of sanctions.
Russia has expressed “regret” over recent reports that Iran is making progress in enriching uranium to weapons-grade level at military sites. But it remains the major power least likely to demand concessions from Iran in Istanbul. It has repeatedly looked to present itself as the champion of Iran at the UN. It has also dismissed the international sanctions regime and publicly criticised the EU and US approach to the issue.
Russia has also looked to distinguish its position from that of China, a major regional competitor, by going much further in support of Iran than Beijing would ever consider.
As such, it is doubtful that Russia is going to back the key EU-US demands that Iran end its production of highly enriched uranium, transfer this material out of the country, shut its underground nuclear facility at Fordow and open up other nuclear sites to international inspectors.
China is unlikely to be opposed to any of these proposals but, as a staunch proponent of dialogue and confidence-building measures, it is likely to have a problem with US secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s demand that the Istanbul meeting achieve “very serious action-oriented negotiations” rather than “open-ended discussions”.
Beijing, which has been adamant that it is opposed to a military solution to the nuclear crisis under any circumstances, will also be uncomfortable with Clinton’s veiled threats that the time for talks is “not infinite” and that “all options remain on the table to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon”.
As it has done in the past, Iran may use the international stage provided by Istanbul to link discussions on the nuclear issue to the lifting of sanctions.
Even if it decides against this tactic, it will be careful not to give the impression that the recent ratcheting up of pressure by the US and the EU has been effective.
It is certainly not going to agree to any binding or substantive concessions at Istanbul without getting something significant in return.
Nevertheless, the Istanbul meeting will have achieved a lot if it can defuse current international tensions by showing that the P5+1 negotiating process remains a viable alternative to military action, if allowed the time to continue.
Rory Miller is director of Middle East and Mediterranean studies at King’s College London