ANALYSIS:THE GOVERNMENT'S decision to buy about one-fifth of the loans from the banks, including the riskiest property development ones, means the taxpayer is assuming as-yet-unknown liabilities that may take 15 years and tens of billions of euro to resolve, writes SIMON CARSWELL
The Government has decided to create a State-run company, the National Asset Management Agency (Nama), to buy property and development loans with a book value of between €80 billion and €90 billion from the banks to cleanse their books in an attempt to free them up to lend more.
Minister Brian Lenihan said yesterday, at a briefing in the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) under whose aegis the Nama will operate and be monitored, that the objective was not to bail out the banks but the economy.
Ireland is the first country in the euro zone to adopt a bad bank model to repair its banking sector. By taking the riskiest loans off the banks’ books, the Government believes it will free up lending because the banks no longer have the drag of unknown losses on loans into a dead property market weighing on their balance sheets.
Lenihan said yesterday the “continued denial or postponement” by Irish lenders on these loan losses carried “a significant economic cost to the country” and that this could not be sustained.
The Government believes Nama will ease the fears of investors on whom the banks rely heavily for funding and, in turn, will reduce the risk of the State being exposed to an expensive “call” under the €440 billion deposit guarantee.
Nama is essentially a toxic or bad bank, though the Government says it will not be all toxic as it will include good loans (sitting in portfolios with bad loans) which borrowers are repaying. By buying portfolios rather than specific loans, the Government will benefit from the profits on good assets.
The State will buy the loans from the banks by issuing them a Government bond worth “significantly less” than face value of the loans, reflecting the sharp drop in the value of the properties provided as security for those loans.
In other words, the State will pay the banks a discount of considerably less than the loans’ €80 billion to €90 billion face value. Among the loans to be transferred are about €60 billion of land and development loans.
The remaining €20 billion to €30 billion of loans to be transferred are secured on investment properties – office blocks, shops and hotels – which have been provided as security for the speculative loans drawn by developers.
The assets to be moved from the two largest banks, Allied Irish Banks (AIB) and Bank of Ireland, could be as high as €50 billion, according to Davy, the stockbroking firm that was majority-owned by Bank of Ireland until 2006.
The State has not yet provided much detail on how Nama will operate, beyond saying that it will be managed like a bank, ensuring “optimal value for money is obtained for the taxpayer” and loans agreements are honoured.
So how will the agency treat the loans and the large amount of properties securing those loans?
Let’s say a builder buys land worth €142 million at the peak of the market in 2006 with a view to developing a large housing estate. His bank has only allowed him to borrow 70 per cent of the property’s value (€100 million). He has also offered the bank two investment properties, buildings comprising shops and offices in Dublin and London worth €30 million, as further security for the loans. There are also loans of €20 million due on these properties.
Under the Nama scheme, the builder’s development and commercial investment loans would be transferred to the State agency. The State would buy his combined €120 million in loans from the banks at a discount – a percentage yet to be agreed in negotiations between the banks and the Government, following the State’s assessments of their loan books.
Nama, which will be staffed by professionals with lending experience, would then force the builder to meet repayments on the loans.
The cost of servicing the Government bonds issued to buy the loans – as well as the money raised to purchase the loans – would “as far as practical” be covered by any loan repayments made by the builder and by the sale of the properties.
Nama would eventually recover its money by managing the loans until they are paid off over time or by forcing the sales of the properties when the market recovers.
Any shortfall would be met by the Government introducing a levy on the banks.
The Government also has the power to assume control or repossess the builder’s properties if he is in default or misses repayments.
Given that many development loans being acquired are not being repaid (the reason for their purchase), the Government can take control of the properties and use them for the State’s purposes.
The scale of the rescue plan is immense and unprecedented for the Government or indeed any EU government. Nama will be the most valuable State-owned company, though with highly toxic assets, and will be among the largest landowner in the country, if not the biggest in the State.
Leaving aside the potential cost to the taxpayer and the risk assumed, the Government could cherry-pick finished unsold buildings and large landbanks among the assets for use by the State.
Ultimately though, Nama’s cost will burden the State with tens of billions of euro worth of additional debt at a time when it is already having to raise record sums to finance the running of the State.
The discount charged by the State when buying the assets will therefore be crucial for the taxpayer and the future of the banks.
It will determine both the cost of the bad bank plan to the State and how quickly taxpayers can recover their money. The discount will also decide whether the banks need additional State investment.
If the discount is set too high, the banks will have to take much larger losses up front, far higher than they had expected. This could force them to seek more capital from the Government, which in turn could lead to the State taking greater ownership of the banks, perhaps with outright nationalisation.
Lenihan conceded yesterday that the State may end up taking “majority” stakes in the banks.
If the discount is too low, the State will pay more than the assets are currently worth, assume a far greater risk and take a much longer period to recoup its losses.
Lenihan said that if there is any shortfall, he will levy the banks to recoup the difference. This will not be introduced until Nama is run down, which could take 10-15 years, according to economist Peter Bacon who devised the plan.
Similar to the State’s bailout of AIB following its disastrous investment in ICI in the 1980s, it could take years to resolve the mess.
The horse trading on the discount begins now – the banks are likely to push for a lower discount, fearing heavy losses, while the Government will want a discount commensurate with the risk assumed.
Lenihan refused to say yesterday how large a discount the Government would seek, saying he could not show his “set of cards” or “prejudge” his position before negotiations began with the banks.
However, it appears that the Government is likely to adopt a view on the level of bad debts that will be more severe than the banks’ own worst-case scenarios.
Davy stockbrokers has suggested a discount – or “haircut” for the banks – of up to 15 per cent on their loans.
This would involve the State paying €76.5 billion for €90 billion in bank loans, or roughly 1.4 times the national debt of the State.
The power to set the sale discount rests with Lenihan. Participation in the State’s bad bank scheme is optional, but the legislation creating Nama will give the Minister mandatory power to buy assets from the banks if necessary.
Nama may fix the banks but taxpayers are signing up to a rescue plan that will long outlive the Government that has hatched it and will load the State with huge debts.
Simon Carswell is Finance Correspondent of
The Irish Times