Sarkozy's timetable for EU to ratify Lisbon looks optimistic

ANALYSIS: The Polish decision to delay signing the treaty has raised the spectre that the ratification process for Lisbon could…

ANALYSIS:The Polish decision to delay signing the treaty has raised the spectre that the ratification process for Lisbon could drift into 2009, writes Jamie Smyth.

French president Nicolas Sarkozy's plan to get all EU states to ratify the Lisbon Treaty before the end of his country's six month presidency of the union is beginning to look a bit optimistic.

Even as the energetic Sarkozy assumed the mantle of "EU-fixer" from previous EU president, Slovenia, yesterday, an ill wind was blowing in from the east.

Polish president Lech Kaczynski's announcement that it is "pointless" to sign the treaty until Ireland works out what it can do next raises the spectre that the ratification process for Lisbon in Europe could drift well into 2009.

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The ratification process is already caught up in lengthy legal challenges in Germany and the Czech Republic, while virulently Eurosceptic Czech president Václav Klaus has already pronounced the treaty "dead".

"The Irish disease is spreading. Everyone feels they can speak out now since the referendum," says Piotr Maciej Kaczynski, a research fellow at the Brussels think tank Centre for European Policy Studies. "Ratification cannot be taken for granted anymore."

France and Germany have both worked strenuously behind the scenes to keep the treaty alive since the Irish voted No on June 12th. At last month's EU summit in Brussels German, chancellor Angela Merkel and Sarkozy piled the pressure on other EU leaders to continue to ratify the treaty.

"They want it to be 26 ratifications to one by the time you vote again next year," said one European diplomat, who acknowledged the strategy was to isolate Ireland and present any new referendum as a vote on EU membership. Setting a firm time limit for ratification before the European elections next June is a key goal for supporters of Lisbon.

This would enable the election to be based on the reforms included within the treaty, rather than having to use the Nice Treaty, which would restrict the number of MEPs to 736 rather than the 751 allowed via Lisbon. (In Ireland's case the Nice Treaty provides for 12 MEPs for 2009 and there will also be 12 MEPs under the Lisbon Treaty).

It would also remove the possibility of further debilitating delays to Lisbon that could provoke extra problems from newly-elected EU leaders who did not negotiate or sign the treaty.

The recent ratification wobbles in Poland, the Czech Republic and Germany could ease the pressure somewhat on the Government, which is still struggling to come to terms with its referendum defeat.

Upcoming EU summits in October and December could prove to be very lonely events for Taoiseach Brian Cowen if all other EU states ratify Lisbon.

The Government's strategy since the referendum has been to play for time and begin analysing its options on how to address the rejection of the treaty.

Some Irish diplomats are praying that another country cannot ratify the treaty, thereby removing Ireland from isolation and potentially dealing the killer blow to the treaty.

The key question over the next six months during the French presidency is whether the current wobbles are important enough to halt ratification in any state?

The Germany situation looks like the easiest one to solve. German president Horst Köhler's decision to suspend ratification of the Lisbon Treaty this week was made on procedural grounds because the constitutional court is still considering the treaty. Court challenges to EU treaties are common in Germany, and while observers say it could delay ratification few observers consider that it would rule that Lisbon is unconstitutional.

The constitutional court in the Czech Republic is also considering whether the treaty is compatible with the Czech constitution. The political climate in the Czech Republic, which is far more Eurosceptic than in Germany, could complicate this process. But despite serious reservations in the Czech senate, the government has recommended to the court that Lisbon is fully in line with its own constitution.

The most likely outcome is that the Czech court will back the treaty and prime minister Mirek Topolánek can garner enough votes to push it through the parliament.

This is far from certain and bullying from Paris and Berlin could prove counterproductive.

At the last EU summit Topolánek dramatically stormed out of the room in response to Franco-German pressure for him to sign up to a pledge for his government to engage in a speedy ratification of the treaty.

But it is Czech president Václav Klaus who could prove to be the major stumbling block for the treaty.

He is considered eccentric by many EU leaders yet commands respect from the public and lawmakers in the ruling Civic Democratic Party, which he co-founded.

Sarkozy has pledged to engage in shuttle diplomacy with Klaus in an effort to get him to change his mind. He will also talk to the Polish president Kaczynski, whose refusal to sign the treaty presents another "Lisbon dilemma" for the French president.

Kaczynski has already developed a reputation for being a maverick in Brussels following his aggressive stonewalling tactics at EU summits to negotiate the Lisbon Treaty and his willingness to veto other European initiatives. And since his own Law and Justice Party was thrown out of government last year, he could be motivated to make life very difficult for the new Polish government led by prime minister Donald Tusk.

Cowen may well be hoping that his Polish ally (the Law and Justice Party are members of the same European political group as Fianna Fáil - Union for Europe of the Nations) will provide him with some breathing space in coming months while he works out what to do next.

But with a very persuasive French president leading the EU presidency over the next six months, relying on the Czechs and Poles to kill off Lisbon could prove a high-risk strategy. Ultimately, Ireland will still be blamed for killing the treaty unless it solves its ratification problem.