WHITHER EUROPE: The "pause for reflection" after the rejection of the European Union constitution by voters in France and the Netherlands is an opportunity to ask some self-critical questions, writes John Bruton
What, in essence, is the European Union for? Is it appropriate to the 21st-century needs of the union's 450 million citizens? Do the needs of those 450 million citizens converge sufficiently for the EU to function effectively?
Does the union, in its present extent, have sufficient shared identity to be able to demand sacrifices from its citizens when necessary? If the EU is to have an inherent outer boundary, should that boundary be set on the basis of physical geography, of shared history and identity, or simply on the basis of compliance with a set of abstract rules?
These existential questions were not really tackled in the convention that drew up the EU constitution. In practice the convention accepted the existing powers and functions as a given. It set out to codify them, clarify the rights of EU citizens, and make some modest changes to enhance the union's capacity to do its existing job. The EU had already been given ambitious objectives and powers, in areas like crime, defence, foreign policy, economic policy and the environment in existing approved treaties, and the convention simply set out to make their exercise more effective.
All the existing EU treaties had a "constitutional" character in that they superseded national laws in their field of application. The EU constitution did not change that. It did not reduce any country's right to withdraw from the EU. Nor did it confer on the union any right to raise taxation, borrow money, or raise a defence force - the sort of things done by the constitutions of states. Unfortunately, by calling what was really a consolidating treaty a constitution, we invited a debate in which certain EU principles, which had long been accepted as essential, were thrown into question.
For example, the debate in France during the recent referendum campaign about the right of "Polish plumbers" to work there suggested that some no longer accepted the most fundamental tenet of the European Union, going right back to its foundation, namely that people in the EU had a fundamental right to live and work in other EU countries. If that is to be called into question, and some have suggested it might be permanently set aside in the event of EU membership by Turkey, then the fundamental nature of the EU would be changed for the worse.
The EU can only work if certain basic principles are accepted, such as the right of free movement and the willingness of member states to implement faithfully decisions of the European Court of Justice, even when they go against the national interest.
There is another set of questions which the convention did attempt to answer. Does the EU need more majoritarian democracy and, if so, what protection should there be for minorities and smaller member states? While no one could claim that the union itself lacks legitimacy in that all its founding treaties were individually approved by all member states, does it need some additional legitimation for its policies, so people feel they have power to change those policies?
In response to these questions, the constitution proposed to give more powers to the European Parliament and to introduce an enhanced system of consultation with national parliaments on EU legislation. It also proposed a system of petitions whereby a minimum number of EU citizens could require the commission to prepare particular legislation. Some argue that was not enough.
The European Parliament is indeed democratically elected and is a co-equal legislator with the Council of Ministers. But MEPs are not as accountable for the way they vote as members of the US Congress or the Dáil. Many of the national systems to elect MEPs use party lists, where those near the top of the list are guaranteed re-election.
Election campaigns for the European Parliament are fought not on the record of the outgoing European Parliament but on the basis of the popularity of parties in national politics. Indeed, the parliament was able to sack the commission, without that even becoming a subject of controversy in the subsequent European Parliament election.
If we want legitimation of EU policies by the people, we need to devise a genuine "European" election, which is fought on EU issues only. That would give the people a sense that they could "throw the government out" at EU level, in the same way as they can at national level which is what legitimates national democracy. Even the proposal to elect a modest number of MEP's from an EU-wide constituency did not get anywhere in the convention. Nor did the more radical proposal that the president of the commission be directly elected by all the people of Europe.
If the EU constitution is to be amended for resubmission to the people of France and the Netherlands, more popular democracy on these lines would be useful. The rights of minorities and smaller states can be protected by retaining the present method of selecting all commissioners other than the president, and the qualification to majority voting in the council that requires a majority to be almost 70 per cent.
More EU-wide popular democracy would gradually create a greater sense of shared identity among EU citizens, sufficient for them to be willing to accept sacrifices for the benefit of those living in other EU states. It would create popular ownership of the EU.
It would not, however, answer all the fundamental questions posed at the beginning of this article. Let me try to answer those now.
What is the EU for? The European Union is an instrument of policy, not a policy in itself; it is a tool rather than an objective. That tool may be used for new, and now unforeseeable, purposes in the future. We cannot, and should not attempt, to prescribe all those purposes in advance in any rigid document.
The EU can achieve things that individual states are too small to achieve separately. It is also a guarantee of good internal democratic governance and security of member states. This EU "seal of approval" is so valuable that countries are queuing up to sacrifice some sovereignty in order to join the EU. The attractiveness of that EU "seal of approval" is one of the reasons why 13 countries - dictatorships when I entered political life - are now democratic members of the EU.
The needs of the 450 million EU citizens converge sufficiently for the EU to function effectively. This is because all of them, even the richest, have a vital interest in maintaining the validity of that seal of approval and in keeping legally enforceable access to one of the largest markets in the world.
As to the boundaries of the union, I do not think these can be set in stone. In practice, all the citizens of the present EU have some shared history and identity. Some of that shared history goes back 2,000 years and some of it goes back to an EU meeting last week where some difficult problem was solved together by consensus. A shared history and identity is a growing and living thing. Its growth can be hastened, but only to a limited extent.
The EU should leave the door of membership open, but explain that membership requires a deep, lasting commitment to develop a common history and identity together.
John Bruton, former taoiseach and Fine Gael leader, is EU ambassador to the US
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