US and British policy to win support for their approach to Iraq has been a failure. Jonathan Eyal examines how they blundered
The US and its close allies duly accepted yesterday that their entire diplomatic effort, designed to produce a United Nations mandate for the war against Iraq, has ultimately failed. Predictably, they packaged their defeat with all the bluster and official display of steely determination that they could muster.
Privately, however, the governments in Washington and London know only too well that their failure is not confined only to the official diplomacy in the UN corridors. For the paralysis in the Security Council is also mirrored in the wider international public opinion. Seldom before have these two governments stumbled so badly in their propaganda effort.
On the face of it, persuading international public opinion that a military action against Iraq is necessary should have been easy. Saddam Hussein is, after all, hardly a popular international figure. Indeed, most of those who currently oppose the war also acknowledge that his removal from power would be desirable.
All of Iraq's immediate neighbours consider him a menace. The elimination of weapons of mass destruction can also be a popular slogan, world-wide. And, despite some hiccups, the US has enjoyed higher levels of support around the world since the terrorist attacks of September 11th. But the result?
Almost without exception, overwhelming majorities in each nation around the world are against the war. And, at least in some countries, President Bush is viewed as just as big a problem as Saddam Hussein.
The reasons for these failures remain complex. Yet some of the major errors which Washington and London have committed in trying the explain their case against Iraq are relatively easy to pinpoint.
In dealing with Middle Eastern issues, the US always starts with a huge disadvantage. Most Arabs regard American policy as duplicitous and hostile to their interests. America's unstinting support for Israel - and seeming indifference to the plight of the Palestinians - is also resented throughout the wider Muslim world.
As the only superpower, the US also automatically acquires the image of bully, however justified Washington may be in pursuing any given policy. Most of the world views the US with a mixture of admiration and apprehension, and often in equal measures. A tinge of instinctive anti-Americanism therefore lingers around the world.
America's penchant to justify any action in often subjective but invariably sanctimonious terms such as "democracy" or the "common good" does not help either. In short, any attempt by the US to push a new policy is bound to encounter handicaps, however good Washington may be in explaining its thinking.
But this does not mean that such obstacles cannot be overcome. Suspicions about America's policies in the Middle East could have been addressed by combining military pressure against Iraq with political pressure on Israel to return to the negotiating table. This, after all, is what many of America's allies have long suggested. However, President Bush chose to ignore this advice; for much of the current Iraqi crisis, he remained silent on the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. The US has now finally revealed its future peace plan for the Middle East. It is a classic example of doing too little, too late.
Latent anti-Americanism around the world, and the image of the US as a bully, could have also been addressed by patiently trying to build a coalition of countries against Iraq. It is now a well-known secret that preparations for the war against Iraq started more than a year ago in Washington.
But for many months, the administration stubbornly refused to discuss the crisis in the United Nations. The delay was fatal, for it deprived the US of the moral high ground and virtually precluded the creation of a solid pro-American coalition. Many countries, particularly in Europe, could have been privately persuaded on the merits of the American case, if this was made gently and persistently.
However, few were able to accept Washington's line after this was declared publicly, and with little international consultation.
Yet probably the biggest public relations mistake that Washington and London committed was to constantly change the official justification for the war. It is now usually forgotten that America's first gambit was to accuse Iraq of harbouring al- Qaeda terrorists. No evidence was ever produced, and this argument faded away, with little subsidiary explanation.
Washington then quickly shifted to claiming that it wanted "regime change" in Iraq. When some of America's allies, and particularly the British who had some influence, privately pointed out that this was hardly a justification under international law, the argument shifted to weapons of mass destruction.
And, as international opposition grew, all the three arguments were suddenly blended together: Saddam had to be removed because if he remained in power he would develop terrible weapons, as well as attracting future terrorists. And, yes, in between there were various claims that the war would bring democracy to Iraq. As every first-year student of public relations knows, the cardinal rule in any successful propaganda campaign is to decide on one simple message, and to stick with it all the way. This is precisely what Washington did not do.
And this fundamental error was compounded by two other pitfalls, which belong much more to the execution of a propaganda campaign. The US failed to realise that it was engaged in the most difficult exercise of all: that of persuading public opinion of the need to resort to war against a supposed danger which has existed for decades, and to which, for better or worse, the entire world had became accustomed.
At no point did the Americans manage to explain the supposed urgency of their task: as the French have repeatedly asked in the Security Council, if Saddam Hussein was allowed to exist for years, complete with all his weapons of mass destruction and internal terror techniques, why the urgency of tackling him today? And, even if tackle we must, why does it have to happen immediately? Washington could have provided answers to these questions from the start, but didn't.
Another tactical error which could have been avoided was to realise that the international electronic media has now slipped away from the control of the US and Britain, or of the wider English-speaking world. Even as late as a few years ago, two satellite news television stations, CNN and BBC World, dominated much of the satellite television market.
Today, many more international satellite stations fight for this market in local languages, and especially in the Arab world. This requires a different media strategy; the old technique of holding daily press conferences in the Pentagon or the White House, and expecting these to be beamed around the world in their entirety, complete with visual displays of alleged Iraqi missile sites, has now outlived its usefulness.
American and British politicians were aware of this development, and duly tried to appear on other media networks. But their language handicaps and their inability to tailor their message to smaller yet more specific audiences was painfully obvious. The proliferation of satellite news networks has transformed Washington's ability to manage the media. Everyone understood this, apart from the US itself.
None of these considerations will prevent the impending attack on Iraq. But they will make the management of the war much more difficult. The crisis leading to the war remains a classic text-book case of how not to organise an international propaganda campaign. If there are any public relations mistakes which could have been made, the US and Britain have committed them all in the past few months.
Jonathan Eyal is Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London