Baghdad has decided to pursue a confrontational policy towards the United Nations, risking military action by Washington and London, because the Iraqi leadership believes it cannot lose. Boxed in by sanctions, Baghdad cannot rebuild its shattered economy or feed its people. But since full sanctions remain in place after seven long years, Baghdad has clearly decided it has no option but to throw down a challenge. The path it has chosen is to expel the UN weapons monitors.

The Iraqi calculation would seem to be that co-operation with the UN commission has brought no relief, so non-co-operation can do little harm and could decisively shift the balance of political advantage within the Security Council in Iraq's favour. Iraqi policy planners, sitting in isolated, embargoed Baghdad, seem to have followed very closely the considerable transformation of the world scene since the US assembled its "Desert Storm" coalition to drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1991. The heady days of the triumph in the desert have passed, leaving a readiness to make up with Baghdad in some countries and deep resentment in the Arab world over the continuation of crippling sanctions against Iraq.

Iraq, in the eyes of those well-disposed towards its people, has become a victim rather than a victimiser. Over the past 6 1/2 years Iraq has largely been deprived of its weapons of mass destruction and its missile capabilities, in spite of UN reports of Iraqi noncompliance with Gulf War ceasefire requirements.

As a result Iraq has been rendered defenceless against its traditional enemies, Turkey and Iran, which have mounted military operations inside or against Iraqi territory, and against movements which have tried to destabilise the country. The US has not and massively breaches Iraqi sovereignty, while criticising Iran for infrequent air raids. In the international community, Russia, France and China, all permanent members of the Security Council, are among those countries that would like to see an end to sanctions. Ostracism and sanctions have produced a siege mentality amongst Iraqis while abortive US-backed attempts to overthrow President Saddam Hussein's government have enabled him to tighten his grip on power. The international context has been transformed over the seven years since the sanctions were first imposed. When Iraq occupied Kuwait in August 1990, the world was emerging from the Cold War and the US was seeking to assert itself as the sole superpower. In response to the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, Washington forged a 30-member coalition with the aim not only of preventing this breach of international law but also of deterring other potential aggressors. The coalition triumphed easily over Iraq's army and forced Baghdad to sign a crippling ceasefire document.

But as the US was not prepared to deal militarily with other problems in Bosnia or Africa, or honour its pledge to establish a genuine new "World Order", the Gulf War alliance soon began to disintegrate.

The earliest evidence of dissolution came on the Middle East front when Washington failed to compel Israel to yield land for peace with the Arabs in the one-on-one negotiations which followed the regional peace conference in Madrid in 1991. The Arab states had joined the US-led coalition against Iraq in the expectation that Washington would then use its political clout with Israel to achieve a settlement based on the land-for-peace formula.

When the US failed them, the Arabs distanced themselves from the coalition, denying Arab cover for military action undertaken against Iraq. The refusal of most Arab states to attend the regional economic forum opening in Qatar tomorrow is one aspect of withdrawal and rejection. But more telling was the fact that early this week all Arab states, including Kuwait, stated their opposition to US military action against Iraq for its rejection of US inspectors on UN monitoring teams. Kuwait has previously been eager to see any sort of Western action, diplomatic or military, against Baghdad.

The fact that Kuwait, Iraq's former victim, is falling in with the general Arab line, in spite of the emirate's total dependence on US military protection, shows just how much the new constellation of political forces and popular attitudes has transformed the reactions of autocratic Arab governments.

While Iraq has exploited the new regional situation to make its case against sanctions at the UN, Baghdad's arguments have made little or no impact in Washington.

Both the US Congress and the Pentagon have urged the White House to order military strikes against Baghdad.

Continuing the confrontation can only increase pressure on the Clinton Administration to take action which, it seems, may be welcomed by Iraq in the expectation that a Cruise missile strike might encourage opponents of US policy finally to take a strong stand - both in the Security Council and outside it. See also pages 13 and 15